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The First Liability Insurance Cartel
in America, 1896–1906
SACHIN S. PANDYA
This article studies the rise and fall of the first liability insurance cartel in
the United States. In 1886, insurance companies in America began selling
liability insurance for personal injury accidents, primarily to cover business
tort liability for employee accidents at work and non-employee injuries
occasioned by their business operations.1 In 1896, the leading liability
insurers agreed to fix premium rates and share information on policyholder
losses. In 1906, this cartel fell apart.
Although largely forgotten until now, the rise and fall of this cartel
confirms the expectations of both cartel theory and past studies of insur-
ance cartels, largely in fire insurance, showing how insurers engaged in
unstable price-fixing efforts and shared information to better estimate
future claims costs.2 Moreover, this liability insurance cartel offers a
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1. Capt. A.W. Masters, “Policy Forms in Liability Insurance,” The Standard (Extra
Number) (1894): xxvi; see also Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp. v. Merrill, 29 N.E.
529, 529–30 (Mass. 1892) (generally describing the various types of liability insurance pol-
icies sold by the Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation).
2. See Dalit Baranoff, “A Policy Of Cooperation: The Cartelisation of American Fire
Insurance, 1873–1906,” Financial History Review 10 (2003): 119–36; Marc Schneiberg,
“Political and Institutional Conditions for Governance by Association: Private Order and
Price Controls in American Fire Insurance,” Politics & Society 27 (1999): 67–103;
William Hamlin Wandel, The Control of Competition in Fire Insurance (Lancaster: The
Art Print. Co., 1935); and Robert Riegel, “Rate-Making Organizations in Fire Insurance,”
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 70 (March 1917):
deviant case for standard accounts of how law and legal institutions
influenced industrial organization in the United States at the turn of the
twentieth century.
In standard accounts of industrial organization at this time, researchers
largely emphasize how firms across industries moved from cartels to hori-
zontal mergers as strategies to control price competition. The firms joining
cartels were largely in relatively new capital-intensive mass-production
industries that had been rapidly expanding on the eve of the Depression
of 1893. Given their high fixed costs, those firms responded to the decline
in demand by lowering prices, and then, to control the ensuing price com-
petition, by forming cartels to fix prices or production levels. From 1895 to
1904, about twenty percent of industries experienced significant consolida-
tion activity.3 Some scholars explain this merger wave by pointing to legal
factors. By 1895, the Sherman Act clearly prohibited cartel agreements, but
did not clearly preclude consolidation through state-chartered corporations,
whereas states could have, but largely did not, use their powers under state
corporate law to restrict horizontal mergers.4
172–98. For Great Britain and Australia, see Robin Pearson, Insuring the Industrial
Revolution: Fire Insurance in Great Britain, 1700–1850 (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing
Co., 2004), 149–56; and Monica Keneley, “The Origins of Formal Collusion in
Australian Fire Insurance 1870–1920,” Australian Economic History Review 42 (2002):
54–76. Early life insurers in the United States appear to have pooled information to better
estimate mortality risk. Sharon Ann Murphy, Investing in Life: Insurance in Antebellum
America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2010), 241–54.
3. Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1990), 38–52, 317–19; Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Great Merger
Movement in American Business, 1895–1904 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985).
4. Fligstein, Transformation, 59–74, 317–21; and George Bittlingmayer, “Did Antitrust
Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?,” Journal of Law & Economics 28 (1985): 77–
118. But see Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism,
1890–1916 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 159–63; and Donald J.
Smythe, “The Supreme Court and the Trusts: Antitrust and the Foundations of Modern
American Business Regulation from Knight to Swift,” U.C. Davis Law Review 39 (2005):
85–147. On state failure in restricting horizontal mergers, see Herbert Hovenkampf,
Enterprise and American Law, 1836–1937 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991),
241–67; and Charles W. McCurdy, “The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and The
Modernization of American Corporation Law, 1869–1903,” Business History Review 53
(1979): 336–40. On state statutory law governing mergers and inter-corporate stock holding,
see William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation
in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 144–75; and Jonathan
Chausovksy, “State Regulation of Corporations in the Late Nineteenth Century: A
Critique of the New Jersey Thesis,” Studies in American Political Development 21
(2007): 57–64.
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For some, however, the standard accounts have largely ignored or sup-
pressed substantial variation within and across industries along many
dimensions of industrial organization, including cost structure, organiz-
ational form, and inter-firm cooperation.5 For example, Berk concludes
that standard accounts of American industrialization have mistaken a part
for the whole, based on past research on custom, specialty, and batch
industries; the persistence of non-corporate organizational forms in fire
insurance and electricity; and the fact that “only 22 percent of U.S. industry
participated in the great merger wave.”6
Similarly, although the first liability insurance cartel does not challenge
arguments about the influence of antitrust and corporate law on the merger
wave, the story of its rise and fall raises the possibility that, in the eighty
percent of industries that did not experience significant consolidation
activity, possible legal influences on industrial organization may have sub-
stantially varied within and across industries in ways that standard accounts
have not fully appreciated.7
First, the first liability insurance cartel does not easily fit standard
accounts of the legal influences on industrial organization. Insurance com-
panies generally enjoyed immunity from federal antitrust regulation. From
1869 until June 1944, the United States Supreme Court consistently
declared that Congress’ power under Article I of the United States
Constitution to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States” did
not cover insurance,8 thereby arguably precluding action against insurance
companies under the Sherman Act, which Congress had enacted pursuant
to this power.9 This shield from federal antitrust regulation (partly revived
5. See Gerald Berk, Louis D. Brandeis and the Making of Regulated Competition, 1900–
1932 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 7–14; Philip Scranton, Endless
Novelty: Specialty Production and American Industrialization, 1865–1925 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1997); and Gerald Berk and Marc Schneiberg, “Varieties in
Capitalism, Varieties of Association: Collaborative Learning in American Industry, 1900
to 1925,” Politics & Society 33 (2005): 46–87.
6. Berk, Louis D. Brandeis, 12.
7. An example is the influence of receivership law on the capital structure of American
railroads. See, for example, Bradley Hansen, “The People’s Welfare and the Origins of
Corporate Reorganization: The Wabash Receivership Reconsidered,” Business History
Review 74 (2000): 377–405; and Peter Tufano, “Business Failure, Judicial Intervention,
and Financial Innovation: Restructuring U.S. Railroads in the Nineteenth Century,”
Business History Review 71 (1997): 1–40.
8. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869); United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); Boris I. Bittker and Brannon P. Denning,
Bittker on the Regulation of Interstate and Foreign Commerce (Gaithersburg: Aspen Law
& Business, 1999), § 3.08[A] at 3–48 (discussing Paul’s progeny during this period).
9. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209.
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in 1945 by Congress10) allocated regulatory authority over the insurance
business in the States to state governments and state law, including state
antitrust statutes, statutes that expressly barred some kinds of insurers
from cooperative rate-setting, and state common law on unreasonable
restraints of trade. Here, fire insurance and liability insurance diverge.
Despite some lawsuits against fire insurance companies during this
period,11 no one appears to have sued any member of the first liability
insurance cartel for violating any such state law.
Second, the distinctive structure of the liability insurance market
suggests a distinctive possible legal influence: state solvency regulation
of liability loss reserves. Unlike traditional industries with high fixed
costs, sellers of insurance only know what their policies actually cost
sometime after sale, when their policyholders suffer losses during the
term of the policy and seek payment. If the odds or severity of the insured
event vary significantly over time, those future costs may be both hard to
estimate accurately and vary with changes in industry norms for how to
estimate those future costs. If an insurer underestimates future claims
costs and sells at a lower price on that basis, the insurer may not set
aside enough capital in reserve to cover claims when they later arise and
must be paid. Moreover, if this insurer insolvency risk remains positive
and hard for buyers to observe at the time of sale, new firms may try to
lure buyers with lower prices by setting aside less in reserve, and therefore
bearing higher insolvency risk.12
Faced with such price competition, insurers can conceivably adopt sev-
eral strategies. They too can lower prices by setting aside less in reserve.
They can, as part of product differentiation efforts, seek ways to credibly
signal to buyers that they have lower insolvency risk than their rivals.
They may share information with their rivals to more accurately estimate
10. Act of March 9, 1945, ch. 20, § 2(b), 59 Stat. 33, 34 (Sherman Act and other specified
federal statutes “shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent such business is
not regulated by state law”).
11. “Legality of combinations or agreements between insurance companies or insurance
agents,” American Law Reports Annotated 21 (1922): 543–57 (collecting cases). For case
studies, see H. Roger Grant, Insurance Reform: Consumer Action in the Progressive Era
(Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1979), 71–89 (Missouri, Kansas, and Texas); and
Steven J. Piott, The Anti-Monopoly Persuasion: Popular Resistance to the Rise of Big
Business in the Midwest (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985), 37–51, 136–37 (Missouri).
12. For a static Bertrand model that accounts for insurer capacity uncertainty but assumes
that buyers can fully calculate insolvency risk, see Ray Rees, Hugh Gravelle, and Achim
Wambach, “Regulation of Insurance Markets,” Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 24
(1999): 65–66. For possible causes of change in liability risk between estimation and cost
realization, see Tom Baker, “Insuring Liability Risk,” Geneva Papers on Risk and
Insurance 29 (2004): 128–49.
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their future claims costs, and with that, their own insolvency risk, if they
compete for the same pool of buyers and they believe that their future
claims costs will be highly correlated with those of their rivals.13 They
may agree to fix prices as a way to jointly ameliorate price competition
and secure monopoly profits. Or they may seek or support state regulation.
For example, at the time State insurance codes typically required fire insur-
ance companies to set aside fifty percent of gross annual premium income
as an “unearned premium” reserve,14 that is, capital designated and set
aside in advance to cover any and all future claims on policies that may
occur before those policies expire.
The rise and fall of the first liability insurance cartel raises the possibility
that under certain conditions, insurance firms may be motivated to join
price-fixing arrangements in part to credibly signal to buyers that because
they are cartel members, they have lower insolvency risk than their non-cartel
rivals.15 If so, this suggests solvency regulation as a possible cause of the car-
tel’s fall. By the 1890s, many states had statutes on the books to reduce insur-
ance insolvency risk, both generally and for certain insurance lines, such as
fire insurance. In this respect, however, state regulation of liability insurance
differed from state regulation of fire insurance, because specific regulation of
liability insurer loss reserves did not exist until 1901, and was limited until
1905. When such regulation began, it may have reduced the value of the car-
tel as a solvency signal, which thereby partly explains why the first liability
insurance cartel fell apart shortly thereafter.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the sources of cost
uncertainty faced by the first liability insurers in the United States. Part
II shows how, in 1896, the leading liability insurance companies formed
the Conference of Liability Companies, and details the terms of their
13. For theory consistent with this expectation, see Michael Raith, “A General Model of
Information Sharing in Oligopoly,” Journal of Economic Theory 71 (1996): 267–68; Xavier
Vives, “Trade Association Disclosure Rules, Incentives to Share Information, and Welfare,”
Rand Journal of Economics 21 (1990): 411–13; and Esther Gal-Or, “Information
Transmission: Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria,” Review of Economic Studies 53 (1986):
91–92.
14. Spencer Kimball, Insurance and Public Policy: A Study in the Legal Implementation
of Social and Economic Public Policy, Based on Wisconsin Records, 1835–1959 (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1960), 150–51 (early development of unearned premium
reserve requirement in Wisconsin for fire and marine insurance companies); and F.C.
Oviatt, “Historical Study of Fire Insurance in the United States,” Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 26 (1905): 164 (early unearned premium reserve
requirements on fire insurers in Massachusetts and New York).
15. On forming producer associations to signal product quality in commodity markets, see
Stéphan Marette and John M. Crespi, “Can Quality Certification Lead to Stable Cartels?,”
Review of Industrial Organization 23 (2003): 43–64.
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arrangement. Part III evaluates four possible complementary explanations
for why this cartel abandoned its price-fixing effort in 1906: price compe-
tition from non-Conference rivals; defections by Conference members;
state competition law; and state solvency regulation of liability insurance
loss reserves. Of these, the article concludes that, given the available evi-
dence, price competition from non-Conference rivals and state solvency
regulation are plausible explanations, whereas state competition law is a
less plausible one and the influence of Conference-member defections is
unclear. The Conclusion identifies the limits of this article and suggests
directions for future research.
I. Background: Pricing Liability Risk
This Part describes the uncertainties faced by the first liability insurers of
personal injury accidents as they tried to set prices. It shows how they
priced employers’ liability insurance—a major type of liability insurance
sold at the time—and how their uncertainty about future losses motivated
both price competition and, for some insurers, efforts to signal buyers that
they had less insolvency risk than their rivals.
The first liability insurer for personal injury accidents in the United
States emerged in 1886, when George Endicott, a prominent fire and mar-
ine insurance broker in Boston, started the United States branch of the
London-based Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation in a single
room up one flight of stairs on State Street in Boston.16 Other companies
quickly joined the liability insurance business—on one account, fourteen
companies had joined by early 1894.17 Most of these early liability insurers
were stock companies that sold multiple lines of insurance nationwide. For
example, the Fidelity and Casualty Company, reportedly the first casualty
company to sell multiple insurance lines,18 was by 1895 selling liability
insurance as well as accident, burglary, fidelity, plate glass, and steam
boiler insurance.19
16. “Death of the Pioneer of Employers’ Liability Insurance in the United States,” Weekly
Underwriter, December 10, 1898, 331; and Harry Perry Robinson, The Employers’ Liability
Assurance Corporation Ltd., 1880–1930 (London: Waterlow & Sons Ltd., 1930), 61–63.
17. E. W. De Leon, “Liability Insurance – Its Origin and Growth,” The Spectator, April
26, 1894, 253.
18. Raymond N. Calverly, “The Background of the Casualty and Bonding Business in the
United States,” Insurance Counsel Journal 6 (October 1939): 63.
19. Thirty-Seventh Annual Report of the Superintendent of Insurance of the State of
New York: Parts II, III, and IV. Life, Casualty, Title, Credit, Mortgage Guarantee and
Assessment Insurance (Albany: James B. Lyon, 1896), 244.
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In pricing liability insurance, the first liability insurers faced the new and
difficult task of accurately estimating policyholder liability risk. For a pol-
icy covering employer tort liability for workplace accidents, for example,
insurers calculated the premium by multiplying an employer-provided esti-
mate of the employer’s payroll during the policy period with a premium
rate, usually calculated in terms of $100 of payroll. With the payroll esti-
mate, the insurer could calculate the liability insurance policyholder’s acci-
dent risk by type of trade or industry,20 much the way the Fidelity and
Casualty Company did from 1889 to 1903 (Table 1).
The harder question was how to set the premium rate: the way to convert
estimates of accident risk into estimates of liability risk. Initially, the first
liability insurers based premium rates roughly on accident insurance pre-
mium rates, and then adjusted them on an ad hoc basis.21 Indeed, some
companies may have deliberately published inflated premium rates in
their rate manuals to make it easier for insurance agents to “cut” those
rates to increase sales.22
Still, although these insurers also set aside an unearned premium
reserve,23 uncertainty arose from the fact that most liability losses tended
to accrue several years after the policy had expired. The accident and its
liability loss did not happen at the same time. Rather, for every covered
accident, the liability insurer only knew its actual cost after settlement,
final judgment, or when the statute of limitations expired. In hindsight,
20. See W.F. Moore, “Liability Insurance,” Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science 26 (1905): 325–26; A.W. Masters, paper on Liability Insurance,
excerpted in Weekly Underwriter, September 9, 1899, 178; and Walter G. Cowles, “The
Relation of Payroll to Certain Liability Lines,”Weekly Underwriter, February 18, 1905, 143.
21. Stanley L. Otis, “The Bureau of Liability Insurance Statistics,” The Spectator,
November 12, 1908, 260.
22. Harris Brockway Johnson recalled that he created the first liability insurance manual
for Travelers Insurance Company at the behest of Travelers President James G. Batterson:
“[Batterson] immediately said, ‘Harry, we must have a manual.’ ‘Why?’ I asked.’ ‘The
only reason the other companies have them is to show them and then cut the rates, making
the prospect believe he’s getting a bargain.’ ‘All right,’ he said, ‘we shall do the same.’ So I
made up the first Liability manual of The Travelers, and believe me I made the figures high
enough to allow for substantial cuts.” Harris Brockway Johnson, “Memories of a
Remarkable Man,” The Travelers Beacon 21 (Jan.–Feb. 1940): 3.
23. Sylvester C. Dunham, “Liability Insurance,” in Yale Insurance Lectures, vol. 2 (Tuttle,
Morehouse & Taylor Press, 1904), 244–45; W. F. Moore, “Employers’ Liability Insurance,”
in Insurance: “A Text-Book”: A Compilation of the Addresses Delivered Before the
Twenty-Ninth Session of the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners, Held at
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, September 13–16, 1898, ed. William A. Fricke (Milwaukee:
Published for the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners, 1898), 955; and
Ralph H. Blanchard, Liability and Compensation Insurance (New York: D. Appleton &
Co., 1917), 265–67.
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Table 1. Fidelity and Casualty Company Liability Experience, 1889–1903, by Industry Type.
Industry Wage
Expenditures
Accidents Persons Employed on Assumption of
$500 Average Annual Wages
Proportion of Persons
Injured: 1 in
Accidents per
$100,000 of Wages
Bakers and
Confectioners
35,620,283 1,729 71,241 41.20 4.85
Bridge Builders 6,554,298 2,855 13,109 4.59 43.56
Carriage & Wagon
Builders
17,558,322 1,180 35,117 29.76 6.72
Chemical & Color
Workers
69,557,839 5,587 139,116 24.90 8.03
Contractors 151,473,698 27,657 302,947 10.95 18.26
Electric Light and
Power
26,631,740 3,749 53,263 14.21 14.08
Leather 64,117,232 2,420 128,234 52.99 3.77
Lumber 129,698,868 15,575 259,398 16.65 12.01
Metal Works 377,064,010 44,723 754,128 16.86 11.86
Milling 14,471,238 675 28,942 42.88 4.66
Mining 115,264,632 11,225 230,529 20.54 9.74
Miscellaneous 190,763,263 14,755 381,527 25.86 7.73
Oil 12,081,597 1,516 24,163 15.94 12.55
Ore Reduction 28,025,226 2,574 56,050 21.78 9.18
Paper 55,382,868 4,505 110,766 24.59 8.13
Pottery 53,681,734 2,422 107,363 44.33 4.51
L
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ay
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Printing 54,884,422 1,996 109,769 54.99 3.64
Quarries & Stone
Cutters
42,387,902 3,433 84,776 24.69 8.10
Stamping 7,174,327 2,024 14,349 7.09 28.21
Stevedores &
Steamships
50,365,638 7,795 100,731 12.92 15.48
Textile 222,560,852 7,579 445,122 58.73 3.41
Warehouses &
Stores
47,788,370 1,888 95,577 50.62 3.95
Wood 129,072,020 15,868 258,144 16.27 12.29
Special Risks 3,335,019 1,358 6,670 4.91 40.72
Total 1,905,515,398 185,088 3,811,030 20.59 9.71
Source: “Employers-Liability Accidents,” Monthly Bulletin of the Fidelity and Casualty Company (Sept. 1906): 135. Columns 4–6 are author’s
calculations that slightly differ from calculations in the original.
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we can see the actual distribution of liability losses across the years after
the policy year. Figure 1 reports the average five-year distribution of losses
for liability insurance policies nationwide for four major liability insurance
companies doing business in Michigan. It shows that, for these companies,
most of the loss costs associated with a particular year’s liability insurance
business occurred in the year immediately after the policy year, and
dropped significantly thereafter. Others looked back at the distribution of
losses paid under liability insurance policies over a ten-year period, and
found similar results.24
Figure 1. Five-year distribution of liability losses paid as a fraction of liability
premiums collected in the policy year. Source: Report of Employers’ Liability
Commission to the Governor of Iowa (Des Moines: Emory H. English, 1912),
109-13 (based on data filed with Michigan Insurance Department). The Fidelity
and Casualty Company asserted that, unlike some other companies, it did not
include claims expenses with paid losses. “Michigan Loss Ratios,” Monthly
Bulletin of the Fidelity and Casualty Company (June 1905): 88.
24. Report of the Employers’ Liability Commission of the State of Illinois (Chicago:
Stromberg, Allen & Co., 1910), 13–14; and William Penman, Jr., “On the Valuation of
the Liabilities of an Insurance Company under its Employers’ Liability Contracts,”
Journal of the Institute of Actuaries 45 (1911): 137–38 (comment by W.R. Strong).
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Without the benefit of hindsight, some liability insurers set aside each
year, in addition to their unearned premium reserve, a special reserve
specifically to cover future liability losses. This signal of solvency had
credibility problems, because it was difficult for insurance buyers to
know whether that reserve was adequate. Rather than rely on companies’
own published figures, the Spectator, an insurance trade publication, coun-
seled its readers in 1895 to look closely at the insurer’s reputation, and in
particular, to whether the insurer is defending “an unusually large percen-
tage of suits rather than settling them,” or is “appealing from an unusual
percentage of verdicts.” If so, that would indicate an increase in the average
cost of its suits and claims, and render “fictious” the insurer’s allotted
reserve for unsettled claims and suits.25
Uncertain insolvency risk also resulted in price competition with rivals
who took advantage of uncertain insolvency risk by setting aside less in
reserve in order to sell their policies at lower prices. The older insurers
often stressed that this practice–at the time called rate-cutting–increased
insolvency risk. As Fidelity and Casualty’s George Seward wrote to his
agents in 1892, “It seems to be impossible for the newer companies to
recognize the fact that there is a distant and contingent liability hanging
over them. Because they don’t meet their losses at once as in Fire
Insurance, they seem to think that they will not occur. THE
CONSEQUENCE IS THAT THEY SHOW A READINESS TO CUT
RATES, WHICH IF PERSISTED, WILL LEAD THEM INTO
BANKRUPTCY.”26
By stressing rivals’ rate-cutting, these insurers were engaged in a form of
product differentiation by stressing their rivals’ high insolvency risk and
their lower insolvency risk. Thus, Seward reminded his insurance agents
in 1901 to stress that the Fidelity and Casualty Company “is old in the
business, well tried and of undoubted strength. In this way he will set
forth the intrinsic value of the insurance offered by him, as against the
lack of evidence of intrinsic value which can be offered by the rate-cutting
agent.”27 Yet, as the editors of the Spectator had put it in 1895, as the pub-
lished statements of liability insurers “involve so much of the unknown,”
the “average manufacturer or merchant may be well pardoned for mistak-
ing the apparent for the real, and considering that he has done well in
25. “The Condition of the Liability Insurance Companies,” The Spectator, October 31,
1895: 204.
26. Letter to Field Agents, Liability Lines, Fidelity and Casualty Company, dated
February 1, 1892 (capitalization and underline in original), in Box 2, Folder 1, Seward
Papers, New York Historical Society, New York, NY.
27. “Cut Rate Competition,” Monthly Bulletin of the Fidelity & Casualty Company of
New York 6 (April 1901): 56.
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accepting the policy of the company which offers the lowest premium
rather than that which offers the greatest protection.”28
II. The Rise of the Liability Conference
In 1896, the major liability insurers agreed to fix prices and pool infor-
mation on liability losses. This Part describes how they reached this agree-
ment, its key terms, and how long it lasted.
On February 15, 1894, representatives of six leading liability insurers
met at the Fifth Avenue Hotel in New York City. Their goal: to set pre-
mium rates, that is, to fix prices.29 By March, the group had agreed to
adopt a uniform policy and set premium rates according to a “regular tar-
iff.” The agreement later fell apart, because of a last-minute defection by A.
W. Masters, of the London Guarantee and Accident Company.30
In this first of several efforts to fix prices and pool liability loss data, the
liability insurers were imitating the fire insurance business, which by the
1890s had allocated rate-setting authority to organizations of local fire
insurance agents.31 (American liability insurers may also have been
aware of contemporaneous rate-setting efforts by accident insurance com-
panies in England.32) Among American liability insurers, Travelers
Insurance Company President James G. Batterson, for one, urged rival
liability insurance company managers also to adopt rate setting to solve
the rate-cutting problem.33 After a second attempt fell apart in 1895,34
28. “The Condition of the Liability Insurance Companies,” The Spectator, October 31,
1895, 204.
29. Meeting of Casualty Companies, The Standard, February 17, 1894, 169; and Weekly
Underwriter, February 17, 1894, 109.
30. “Employers’ Liability Tariff Movement Blocked,” The Standard, March 24, 1894, 315.
31. Baranoff, “A Policy of Cooperation,” 119–36.
32. William R. Strong, “The Growth of Accident and Employers’ Liability Insurance in
Great Britain,” in Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress on Actuaries: Held
in New York, under the auspices of the Actuarial Society of America, August 31 to
September 5, 1903 (New York: Actuarial Society of America, 1904): 685; Weekly
Underwriter, May 30, 1896, 363; H.A.L. Cockerell and Edwin Green, The British
Insurance Business: A Guide to its History & Records, 2nd ed. (Sheffield: Sheffield
Academic Press, 1994), 88.
33. See, for example, Batterson to Geo. M. Endicott, October 2, 1894, Vol. 2, President’s
Letters, p. 593; Scrapbooks, Letterbooks, & Miscellaneous, Box 4; President’s Interests;
Executive, Record Group 2; Travelers Insurance Company, Hartford, CT. Hereafter, PL2
refers to items from this bound volume of letters.
34. Weekly Underwriter, June 29, 1895, 455; “Liability Companies’ Agreement Receives
a Set Back,” The Standard, July 20, 1895, 57; Weekly Underwriter, August 17, 1895, 79;
Batterson to Geo. M. Endicott, Esq. Chairman, etc., dated August 16, 1895, PL2, p. 724;
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Batterson continued to do so.35 Other justifications included the benefits of
information pooling. As Fidelity and Casualty’s George Seward recounted
to an insurance journal publisher a few days after the second attempt began
in 1895, the proposed information-pooling effort “was the most important
. . . . The field is so new that some of the gentlemen who attended the con-
ference can hardly be considered to ha[v]e knowledge enough of the loss
ratio in different classifications to judge what premium they ought to
secure.”36 If the prospect of monopoly profits also motivated company
managers, they did not mention this motive publicly.
In 1896, on the third attempt, they succeeded. By March, the major liab-
ility insurance companies had formed what later became known as the
Conference of Liability Companies.37 George Endicott was its first
President.38 The companies agreed to set premium rates, adopt standard
policy forms, appoint an arbitrator to disputes among them, and establish
“a bureau of statistics” authorized to “to call for tabulations of the experi-
ence of each company to collate same, and to prepare for consideration
such proposals as to change rate as the circumstances may call for.”39
In June 1896, the Conference’s rules, regulations, and premium rate
schedule went into effect.40 By September, the Conference had adopted
a standard form liability insurance policy for each of the various types
of liability lines.41 The Conference issued revised rate manuals several
times thereafter, including October 1897,42 October 1898, May 1901,
and December 1904.43 In its first manual, the Conference initially set liab-
ility premium rates based on the rates currently set by the Employers’
Liability Assurance Corporation and the Fidelity and Casualty Company.
“Liability Insurance,” The Spectator, July 2, 1896, 2; Weekly Underwriter, August 24, 1895,
87; and Weekly Underwriter, September 21, 1895, 134.
35. Batterson to Geo. F. Seward, Esq. Prest., Fidelity & Casualty Co. N.Y., January 3,
1896, PL2, p. 816; and Batterson to Seward, January 9, 1896, PL2, p. 819–20.
36. Notes of George F. Seward at 1, enclosed with G. Seward to R.R. Dearden, April 3,
1895, Box 2, Folder 9, Seward Papers, New York Historical Society.
37. “Harmonious Meeting of Liability Companies,” The Standard, February 29, 1896,
235; The Spectator, March 12, 1896, 145; and Weekly Underwriter, March 7, 1896, 156.
38. Robinson, Employers’ Liability, 66; and Edson S. Lott, Pioneers of American Liability
Insurance (New York: Montross & Clarke Co., Inc., 1938), 104.
39. Quoted in “Favorable View of Liability Agreement,” The Standard, March 7, 1896,
250.
40. Conference Liability Manual (1896), reprinted in The Insurance Year Book 1896–97:
Life and Miscellaneous (New York: Spectator Co., 1896), 389.
41. The Spectator, September 3, 1896, 101.
42. Weekly Underwriter, October 23, 1897, 231; and “New Liability Rates Promulgated,”
The Standard, October 23, 1897, 416.
43. Otis, “The Bureau,” 261.
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The ultimate goal was to set premium rates based on an analysis, by the
Conference’s Bureau of Statistics and Arbitration, of the loss-experience
data collected from all of the participating companies.44 Stewart Marks,
formerly of the Standard Life and Accident Insurance Company, had
accepted the position as head of that Bureau: the Conference’s chief actu-
ary and its sole arbitrator, the final decider of disputes among members.45
The participating companies also agreed to fix prices by not selling liab-
ility insurance policies at premium rates below those set by the Conference
in the Conference’s Liability Manual. Whereas commissions to agents and
special agents were left to company discretion, no Conference member
could authorize commissions to brokers exceeding fifteen percent gener-
ally, or exceeding ten percent for commissions on premium dollars in
excess of $1,000. Moreover, no agent, special agent, or employee of a
Conference company could “place any risk in any of the liability lines
with any company not a party to the Conference agreement.” And rebates
of commissions, or any other effort to “cut” a rate below the Manual rate,
were prohibited.46
The terms of the Conference Agreement would be enforced by its
Bureau of Arbitration, in which the Agreement vested authority to
direct cancellation of any policy written in violation of this agreement; may
order the company offending not to write the risk again for a period of one
year; may direct the companies not to accept business from any broker who
more than once violates the terms of this agreement, and may fine any com-
pany which permits any agent or employee to violate this agreement not more
than $100 for each violation thereof. Such fines shall be used to defray the
miscellaneous expenses of the bureau.47
44. “Agreement Reached: Liability Underwriters Agree Upon Rates, Policy Forms, Etc.,”
Insurance Press, March 4, 1896, 1.
45. “Liability Insurance Items,” The Spectator, April 30, 1896, 245; Weekly Underwriter,
March 14, 1896, 174.
46. Conference Liability Manual (1896), reprinted in The Insurance Year Book 1896–97:
Life and Miscellaneous (New York: Spectator Co., 1896): 390. These terms did not change
substantially over the life of the Liability Conference, except that an agent of a Conference
company could place a risk with a non-Conference company if the home office of that com-
pany gave written consent. See Manual of Liability Insurance: Rules and Rates, October,
1898 (n.d.), in The Insurance Year Book 1902–03: Life and Miscellaneous (New York:
Spectator Co., 1902), 331; and Edwin W. De Leon, compiler, Manual of Liability
Insurance Containing the Rules, Instructions, Rates and Classifications adopted by the
Conference of Liability Companies and amended to January 1, 1905 (New York:
Spectator Co., 1909), 31.
47. “The Liability Situation,” The Spectator, October 17, 1898, 185 (quoting letter from
Stewart Marks).
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The Conference arbitrator would receive word of disputes from the com-
panies, which would filter disputes brought to them by agents, and the arbi-
trator would be the final authority in deciding those disputes.48
In contrast to rate-setting in fire insurance, in the structure of the
Liability Conference, local associations of liability insurance agents took
a subordinate role. By early May 1896, and at the urging of the
Conference companies, insurance agents had set up local liability insurance
associations in six cities—New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore,
Chicago, and St. Louis.49 The Baltimore association, for example, required
its members to sign a pledge not to rebate or reduce premiums in violation
of the Conference Agreement. Although the local associations provided
input on liability premium rates,50 unlike local fire insurance boards, the
Conference itself retained the final authority to set rates.
The Conference lasted for about a decade, with members exiting the
Conference during that time (Table 2).
By December 1904, Fidelity and Casualty, one of the four remaining
Conference companies, waxed fatalistic about the “demoralized” liability
line,51 telling its agents: “[I]t is no part of our purpose to participate in any
effort to make a new conference that shall include the rate-cutters. . . .
When the existing Conference goes to pieces, as it may, we are out of
liability conferences for good and all.”52 That month, the remaining
Conference members agreed to maintain their rate agreement.53 In 1905,
the Liability Conference published its fourth manual,54 and the remaining
members of the Conference decided to continue.55 Soon after, however, in
48. “Liability Conference Materially Strengthened,” The Standard, September 12, 1896,
231.
49. “Will Support General Liability Agreement,” The Standard, May 2, 1896, 464; see
also Weekly Underwriter, May 2, 1896, 291–92 (Boston, New York); Weekly
Underwriter, May 9, 1896, 307 (Philadelphia); and “New Liability Association for New
Jersey,” The Standard, February 6, 1897, 164.
50. “Reduced Liability Rates to be Promulgated,” The Standard, May 23, 1896, 542
(New York Liability Association); The Standard, May 30, 1896, 574 (same); and “The
New Liability Rates,” The Standard, June 13, 1896, 612.
51. “Liability Conference,” Monthly Bulletin of Fidelity & Casualty Co. 9 (December
1904): 181.
52. “Liability Rates,” Monthly Bulletin of Fidelity & Casualty Co. 9 (December 1904):
181.
53. Weekly Underwriter, December 10, 1904, 411.
54. Edwin W. De Leon, compiler, Manual of Liability Insurance Containing the Rules,
Instructions, Rates and Classifications adopted by the Conference of Liability Companies
and amended to January 1, 1905 (New York: Spectator Co., 1909).
55. “Miscellaneous Items,” The Spectator, September 21, 1905, 167; Weekly Underwriter,
September 16, 1905, 188; “Decide to Continue the Liability Conference,” The Standard,
September 16, 1905, 259; and “Liability Conference,” Insurance Press, September 20, 1905, 14.
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March 1906, the Conference members voted to abandon the rule prohibit-
ing competition among members.56 Although two new companies would
join the Conference later that summer,57 the Conference was now purely
an information-pooling arrangement. By January 1908, the Spectator
reported that the Conference manual of liability premium rates “has
become a dead letter, discredited and abandoned. All the companies are
going alone, like a vessel where the master has discarded the compass.”58
III. Explanations for the Fall
This Part evaluates four of the possible reasons why the Conference’s
cartel arrangement collapsed in 1906: (1) price competition from
non-Conference rivals; (2) cheating by Conference members; (3) state
competition law; and (4) state solvency regulation of liability loss reserves.
The available evidence suggests that price competition by non-cartel rivals
played an important role; the influence of defection by fellow cartel
Table 2. Liability Conference Membership, 1896–1906.
Company Start Exit
Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation Feb. 1896 Oct. 1904
Travelers Insurance Company Feb. 1896 Oct. 1900
Fidelity and Casualty Company Feb. 1896 March 1906
United States Casualty Company Feb. 1896 March 1906
Standard Life and Accident Insurance Company Feb. 1896 Nov. 1902
London Guarantee and Accident Company Feb. 1896 March 1906
Union Casualty and Surety Company Feb. 1896 Sept. 1899a
Maryland Casualty Company Nov. 1899 March 1906
Sources: “Action By Liability Conference,” The Spectator, March 29, 1906,181; Weekly
Underwriter, March 24, 1906, 217; “Liability Conference Takes Important Action,” The
Standard, March 24, 1906, 289; “Employers’ Withdraws From Liability Compact,”
The Standard, October 28, 1904, 409; “Pleased to Have Maryland as an Ally,” The
Standard, November 25, 1899, 500; “Maryland May Join Liability ‘Compact’,”
The Standard, September 30, 1899, 316; “Liability Company Loses Detroit Company,”
The Standard, November 21, 1902, 482; “Travelers Quits Liability Compact After
All,” The Standard, October 6, 1900, 336; and “Harmonious Meeting of Liability
Companies,” The Standard, February 29, 1896, 235.
aUnion Casualty and Surety transferred its liability business to the Maryland Casualty
Company.
56. “Action By Liability Conference,” The Spectator, March 29, 1906, 181; Weekly
Underwriter, March 24, 1906, 217; Weekly Underwriter, April 14, 1906, 275; “Liability
Conference Takes Important Action,” The Standard, March 24, 1906, 289; and “President
Stone on the Liability Conference,” The Standard, April 14, 1906, 356.
57. “Liability Conference Gains Two New Members,” The Standard, August 4, 1906, 98.
58. “Liability Underwriters,” The Spectator, January 9, 1908, 21.
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members is unclear; and state competition law appears not to have made
much of a difference. The available evidence also is consistent with a
fourth plausible cause: State solvency regulation of liability insurance
loss reserves might have reduced the value of cartel membership as a signal
of company solvency.
A. Price Competition from Non-Conference Firms
Price competition from rival non-Conference firms played an important
role in the demise of the Liability Conference’s price-fixing effort. As
more firms entered the liability insurance market, the share of that market
held by the Conference members began to fall and market concentration
sharply declined (Figure 2). If market concentration implies market
power to set prices,59 this decline suggests that the Liability
Conference’s price-fixing effort became less successful over time.
In accord with this conclusion, reports in the insurance trade press
suggest that at least two Conference members left the Conference because
of price competition from non-Conference firms. In November 1902, the
Standard Life and Accident Company of Detroit withdrew from the
Liability Conference.60 Its President, W.C. Maybury, pointed out that at
its inception, Conference members had written eighty percent of the
business, and that percentage had since dropped to fifty percent.61
Maybury also suggested that his company had left to escape the restrictions
of the Conference agreement.62 A few years later, in late 1904, the
Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation also withdrew, citing its
opposition to higher Conference manual rates scheduled for a month
later, preferring instead a strategy of reducing expenses, particularly
agent commissions.63
59. High market concentration can imply monopoly profits, because collusion is easier
with a relatively small number of firms, but high market concentration may also occur
because some firms are more efficient, and therefore charge lower prices and reap higher
profits, than their rivals. See Byeongyong Paul Choi and Mary A. Weiss, “An Empirical
Investigation of Market Structure, Efficiency, and Performance in Property-Liability
Insurance,” Journal of Risk and Insurance 72 (2005): 635–73 (testing both hypotheses
and finding support for efficiency hypothesis).
60. Weekly Underwriter, November 22, 1902, 293.
61. Weekly Underwriter, December 6, 1902, 316; and “Liability Situation—Standard’s
Withdrawal Discussed With Mr. Maybury and Others,” Insurance Press, November 26,
1902, 1.
62. “Liability Conference Loses Detroit Company,” The Standard, November 21, 1902,
482.
63. “Employers Liability Conference,” The Spectator, November 3, 1904, 229;
“Employers’ Withdraws From Liability Compact,” The Standard, October 28, 1904, 409;
and Weekly Underwriter, October 29, 1904, 293, 296.
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Price competition from new firms destabilized the Conference’s
price-fixing efforts. To illustrate, consider how the Conference responded
to the entry of the Maryland Casualty Company into the liability insurance
market. Shortly after its inception in March 1898, the Maryland Casualty
Company, based in Baltimore, had, according to one account, advertised
that it was “not bound by compact rates,” that is, that it would offer liability
insurance at rates below those in the Liability Conference Manual.64 A few
months later, in early May 1898, the Conference had invited Maryland
Figure 2. Number of firms, Liability Conference market share, and industry
concentration, 1895–1910. Sources: Annual data on liability premiums received by
multi-line stock companies as reported in The Insurance Year Book 1901–1902.
[Life, Casualty and Miscellaneous] (New York: Spectator Co., 1901), 325–32;
The Insurance Year Book 1904–1905 [Life, Casualty and Miscellaneous]
(New York: Spectator Co., 1904), 418–28; and The Insurance Year Book 1911–
1912 [Life, Casualty and Miscellaneous] (New York: Spectator Co., 1911), A-260
to A-287. Mutual insurers selling liability insurance are not included in the
underlying data. Exits from Conference (see Table 2) are coded by calendar year
after the year in which exit occurred.
64. Letter to the Editor, “Cut Rates in Liability Rates,” The Spectator, April 14, 1898, 201
(authored by “Liability Underwriter”).
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Casualty, through its President, John Stone, to join the Conference.65 Stone
refused, pointing to a personality conflict with George Seward, now
President of the Fidelity and Casualty Company.66
In the summer of 1898, Maryland Casualty offered Travelers liability
manager Edwin De Leon a position as its New York agent. De Leon
asked Travelers President Batterson for his advice as a polite way to solicit
a counter-offer. Batterson refused,67 and De Leon soon left for Maryland
Casualty.68 Soon thereafter, Maryland Casualty started a price war.
When De Leon had left Travelers, he had apparently taken “a complete
list of [Travelers’] patrons” and was now “approaching them with cut
rates.”69
In mid-September, Batterson wrote separately to Conference President
Endicott that, in response to the “vicious competition with which we are
confronted,” the Conference companies “are all apparently asking for
special rates on business which they cannot hold at Manual rates.
Maybury asks consent to protect his Baltimore business against new comer
who has stolen his agent. I am in precisely the same fix in New York. . . . .
DeLeon will first go for the risks with which he is familiar, – ours; but he
will not spare any Company’s business which he can get. He is offering 20
per cent. commission where we have paid only fifteen.”70 Batterson added:
“I cannot wait for the Board to act. When the house is on fire, it is not wise
to call a town meeting to see what is best to do about it.”71
Batterson soon proposed that the Conference abandon “the rate book for
competition purposes and leave each Company to protect its own business
65. “Liability Conference Adjourns,” The Standard, May 7, 1898, 531; and “President
Stone on Liability Competition,” The Standard, December 24, 1898, 670.
66. Batterson to George F. Seward, dated October 7, 1898, Vol. 3, President’s Letters,
p. 531; Scrapbooks, Letterbooks, & Miscellaneous, Box 4; President’s Interests;
Executive, Record Group 2; Travelers Insurance Company, Hartford, CT. Hereafter, PL3
refers to items from this bound volume of letters.
67. J. Batterson to E.W. DeLeon, dated August 6, 1898, PL3, p. 391; and J. Batterson to
E.W. DeLeon, August 8, 1898, PL3, p. 393.
68. Weekly Underwriter, September 3, 1898, 121; and “Notes of Insurance Interests,”
New York Times, September 4, 1898, 20.
69. J. Batterson, to W.C. Maybury et al. (cc: Employers Liability, Fidelity & Casualty,
London & Guarantee, U.S. Casualty, Union Casualty), dated September 21, 1898, PL3,
p. 476.
70. Batterson to G.M. Endicott, Sept. 24, 1898, PL3, p. 479. The term “new comer” is a
reference to the Maryland Casualty Company’s hiring away of the Baltimore agent for The
Standard Life and Accident Co., of which W.C. Maybury was president at the time.
Batterson to Geo. F. Seward Esq., Prest., Fidelity & Casualty Co., October 7, 1898, PL3,
p. 531 (referring to how Maryland Casualty President Stone “hired Standard’s agent”).
71. Batterson to G.M. Endicott, September 24, 1898, PL3, p. 480.
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in any way it sees fit. In fact we cannot do otherwise and hold our
agents.”72 He favored continued cooperation “for the sake of combining
the experience of the associated Companies in order to determine the
pure premium on classified risks. We can work together as against a com-
mon enemy and treat each other fairly: but let each Company manage its
own business in its own way.”73
Unwilling to wait for a Conference meeting on the issue, Batterson took
unilateral action. As he told an agent in Louisville, the Maryland Casualty
Company and another non-Conference company, the Frankfort Marine,
Accident and Plate Glass Insurance Company, “are on the war path . . . .
I have determined for this Company that we will meet their rates if necess-
ary to save our desirable risks. . . . [L]ook to your renewals a full month or
two before they mature or you will be caught napping.”74
In the first week of October 1898, the Conference temporarily suspended
its rules and rates pending a meeting on the issue for the following week.75
Conference President Endicott favored dissolution, whereas Seward
supported maintaining the Conference rate agreement.76 When the
Conference finally met, in New York, on October 12, W.T. Dana, the
representative of Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation, issued that
company’s resignation, and then withdrew it, and the story that emerged
in the insurance trade press was that of Conference members holding
firm.77
Yet, less than two weeks after the October 12 meeting, Conference actu-
ary Stewart Marks sent a notice to agents in New York that reminded them
of the Conference limit of fifteen-percent commissions and reaffirmed
the Conference’s authority to take disciplinary action for violation of
that rule.78 The unstated target of Marks’ notice was apparently the
72. Batterson to C.P. Ellerbe Esq., Prest., September 26, 1898, PL3, p. 484.
73. J. Batterson to W.C. Maybury, Esq., Detroit, MI, September 26, 1898, PL3, p. 488;
see also Batterson to G.M. Endicott Esq., Chairman &c., September 26,1898, PL3, p. 490
(“Why can we not send our experience on classified risks to the Bureau, simply giving
the amount insured and the loss thereunder to find the pure premium needed to carry the
risk, and stop there, so far as rates are concerned.”).
74. Batterson to J.B. Pirtle Esq., State Agent, Louisville, KY, September 28, 1898, PL3,
p. 511–12; see also Batterson to Horace W. Power Esq., State Agent, Cleveland OH,
September 28, 1898, PL3, p. 503 (“Until further instructions are received from this
Office, you may govern yourself by the old Manual. We shall try to save our desirable
risks from the Maryland Company on the best terms we can make.”).
75. Weekly Underwriter, October 8, 1898, 211.
76. Batterson to W.C. Maybury, Esq., Managing Director, Detroit, MI, September 26,
1898, PL3, p. 487.
77. “Liability Companies Hold Together,” The Standard, October 15, 1898, 427.
78. Reprinted in “The Liability Situation,” The Spectator, October 27, 1898, 185.
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Travelers. Seward, at least, had complained that Travelers had been paying
twenty-percent commissions in violation of Conference rules.79
By early December 1898, George Endicott was dead,80 and a few weeks
later, the Conference members elected George Seward to succeed Endicott
as Conference president.81 About nine months later, however, in October
1899, the Liability Conference was negotiating with the Maryland
Casualty Company over the terms of its joining the Liability
Conference.82 This was not easy. Because of Maryland Casualty’s price
war with the Conference members in the prior year, some Conference
members appear to have been reluctant to take the company inside. In a
letter to A.W. Masters, general manager of London Guarantee and
Accident, Travelers President Batterson referred to George Seward’s idea
that Maryland Casualty President John Stone “‘ought not to be admitted
until he begins to feels the pressure of losses.’” Batterson found this sug-
gestion impractical, because that time was “indefinite and unknown.”83
The next day, Batterson wrote to mollify Seward: “We all feel alike in
regard to the onslaughts made upon our business by the Maryland; but it
has now become a matter of business and not a question of retaliation or
sentiment.” He added: “Now my esteemed Chairman I want to say that I
admire your fighting qualities, and the way you put your fist down some-
times leads me to an earnest prayer for our enemies, but I cannot agree with
you that we are justified either in delay, or going back of the date when we
opened negotiations by Committee for reasons to sustain that position.”84
A week earlier, Batterson, who apparently had been charged to deal with
Maryland Casualty about Conference membership, had written to
Maryland Casualty President Stone and given him four reasons for joining
Conference. First, “a considerable bulk” of Maryland’s business had been
drawn from the Conference companies “by reduced rates or otherwise” that
were “below the line of safety, and must be unprofitable if continued.”
Second, a threat: some of the Conference companies had a “strong disposi-
tion . . . to regain” the business they had lost to the Maryland “regardless of
the question of profit or loss.” Third, joining the Conference meant that the
Maryland’s liability policies could be renewed at the increased manual
rates, not the lower rates at which they were originally obtained. Finally,
the Maryland would benefit from loss-data pooling without paying a
79. Batterson to Geo. F. Seward, October 29, 1898, PL3, p. 547.
80. “Death of the Pioneer of Employers’ Liability Insurance in the United States,” Weekly
Underwriter, December 10, 1898, 331.
81. “Business of the Liability Conference,” The Standard, December 24, 1898, 662.
82. Batterson to George F. Seward, October 11, 1899, PL3, p. 822–23.
83. Batterson to A.W. Masters, October 13, 1899, PL3, p. 825–26.
84. Batterson to George F. Seward, October 14, 1899, PL3, p. 834–35.
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proportionate share of past expenses and without contributing the same
volume of loss experience as other Conference companies.85 Batterson
urged Stone to move quickly, writing a few days later that “[e]very
day’s delay may bring up some new complications at points where agents
are more anxious to get business than to preserve harmony among the
Companies.”86
Batterson did not mention that absent price competition by a
non-Conference company such as Maryland Casualty, it would become
easier to preserve the price-fixing features of the Conference Agreement.
As Batterson wrote to Seward a few days later: “I am afraid we will not
be able to ‘set our own house in order’ until The Maryland is in the
Conference, for so long as that Company is ‘outside,’ it will be impossible
to control the business ‘inside.’”87 Indeed, Batterson assumed that Stone
“knows as well as we do that Conference agreements as to brokerages
are being broken right along, and that we cannot easily control that so
long as he is outside.”88 By early November, the Maryland Casualty
Company had been persuaded inside.89 Thereafter, no other company
joined the Conference before it abandoned price-fixing in 1906.
B. Defections
Just as price competition came from non-Conference rivals, it may have
also come from fellow Conference members who had covertly defected
from the Conference agreement on prices and commissions. Cartel theory
emphasizes that cartel members have the incentive to defect, because prices
are fixed above the competitive level. Theory also suggests that, when two
sellers agree on a price, if either seller can quickly observe the other’s
defection and respond by “punishing” the first seller by engaging in full-
blown price competition, the threat of such punishment may deter defec-
tion in the first place.90 I have no direct evidence of cheating by
Conference companies, in part because the Conference practice of special
rating makes it hard to prove such cheating, absent data on the actual pre-
mium rates on policies sold by each Conference company.
85. Batterson to John T. Stone, President, October 3, 1899, PL3, p. 810–11.
86. Batterson to Stone, October 6, 1899, PL3, p. 817.
87. Batterson to Geo. F. Seward, Chairman, October 11, 1899, PL3, p. 822.
88. Batterson to A.W. Masters, October 13, 1899, PL3, p. 825.
89. “Maryland Casualty Joins Liability Compact,” The Standard, Nov. 18, 1899, 477. For
the terms and conditions of entry, see Memorandum of J.G. Batterson & Jno. T. Stone,
October 27, 1899, PL3, p. 868.
90. Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988),
245–53.
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Under the Conference special-rating procedure, the Conference could
sanction the sale of a Conference company policy at a “special rate”: a
Conference-approved rate below the manual rate for a particular buyer
when such a rate was ostensibly needed to prevent a buyer from purchasing
liability insurance from a non-Conference company.91 Applications for
special rates, although initiated by local agents, had to come to the
Conference from the home office of the Conference company member,
not from the agent directly.92 Non-Conference rivals scorned special-
rating. In 1904, Aetna Life—a non-Conference liability insurer—reported
to its agents that a “large percentage” of Liability Conference policies
“are specially rated far below their regular Manual, such special
rates being in fact,–when approved by their bureau,–Conference rates.”
Aetna added that a non-Conference company engaged in the “selfsame
procedure . . . is styled ‘rate cutting.’ Surely this is a distinction without
a difference . . . .”93
We do know that Travelers President Batterson complained that the
Conference companies used special rating to protect themselves from com-
petition by other Conference companies. For example, he wrote to
Conference arbitrator Marks in 1898 that “[v]ery few of the special ratings
so far seem to be called for by outside competition, or by a conviction that
the rate is excessive. No one can deliberately look over the list of these
cases without being convinced that the effect, if not the purpose, is to pro-
tect the risk from competition by Conference companies. . . . [T]he
business is being rapidly tied up by special rates and we will soon have
to consult the acts of the Special Rating Committee rather than the
Manual. One special rate of necessity leads to another, because all in the
same business will demand it.”94 A few years later, in April 1900,
Batterson complained: “To keep watch of the special rates applied for,
ascertain (if possible) whether the application is justified by the rules
and if not to file a protest, consume not a little time every day.” It was par-
ticularly hard when “the rate is all right in the application, but the cut is
91. Batterson to Stewart Marks, July 7, 1898, PL3, p. 367; and Batterson to John T. Stone,
October 13, 1899, with attached copy of special rate request from Travelers’ agent, PL3,
p. 829–30; see also “Liability Compact’s Rule on Special Rates,” The Standard,
December 9, 1899, 542.
92. Batterson to E.W. DeLeon, August 5, 1898, PL3, p. 390; and Batterson to DeLeon,
August 8, 1898, PL3, p. 394.
93. Aetna Life Insurance Co., Accident & Liability Dept., “‘Special Rates’ or ‘Cut Rates’:
A Distinction Without A Difference,” Monthly Letter to Our Agents, Oct. 1904, Aetna
Insurance Co., Hartford, CT.
94. Batterson to Stewart Marks Esq., Chief of Bureau, October 28, 1898, PL3, p. 542; and
Batterson to C.P. Ellerbe, Esq., Prest., Union Casualty & Surety Co., November 3, 1898,
PL3, p. 551.
The First Liability Insurance Cartel in America, 1896–1906 397
covered up by a rider.”95 Other Conference company managers may have
shared this view.
Moreover, Conference company managers may also have been resigned
to partial fealty from insurance agents working for Conference companies,
who tended not to want to lose any sale, and the accompanying commis-
sion, to a fellow Conference member. As case studies in other industries
have suggested, rivalry among brokers or independent sales agents may
be an important source of the instability of price-fixing agreements, or at
least a way that company managers can explain indications of defection
from such agreements in way that enabled continued cooperation among
them.96 Traveler’s Batterson pointed to this difficulty for the Conference
agreement: “[T]he ordinary agent considers it a mark of genius to steal a
risk from an associate Company. . . Almost every mail brings advice of
some risk lost to an associate Company by means forbidden. “The agent
made it to our advantage” is about as near as we can get to particulars.”
Batterson, however, also blamed the companies. Although a company
could “cure this by refusing to take the risk or to pay the commission
on stolen business,” the agent “wants business, and will work his
territory against all comers; he will rebate to the extent of his full com-
mission to get a risk on his books, and then will urge the payment of
illegitimate claims to keep it the next year. We all believe this to be
true, but submit rather than be disagreeable about it, and have a row
with our agent.”97
C. State Anti-Trust
In theory, Liability Conference members risked liability under state anti-
trust or competition law, because of the Conference’s agreement on pre-
mium rates and commissions. There appears, however, to be no reported
instance of legal action against a Conference company for violating state
antitrust or competition law because it participated in the Conference.
Moreover, there is only weak evidence that such laws caused the
95. Batterson to A.W. Masters, April 12, 1900; Vol. 4, President’s Letters, p. 51–52;
Scrapbooks, Letterbooks, & Miscellaneous, Box 4; President’s Interests; Executive,
Record Group 2; Travelers Insurance Company, Hartford, CT. Hereafter, PL4 refers to
record items from this bound volume of letters.
96. Mark R. Wilson, “Gentlemanly Price-Fixing and its Limits: Collusion and
Competition in the U.S. Explosives Industry during the Civil War Era,” Business History
Review 77 (2003): 216–18; and David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin, “Rules,
Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case,”
American Economic Review 91 (2001): 393.
97. J. Batterson to W.C. Maybury, Esq., September 26, 1898, PL3, p. 486.
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Conference companies to stop selling liability insurance in particular states,
or affected how long those companies stayed in the Conference.
In public, the Liability Conference responded to antitrust concerns by
imitating fire insurers, who had argued that classic antitrust concerns
about price fixing did not apply to them, because the insurance market
had low barriers to entry and needed rate setting to reduce the insolvency
risk borne of rate cutting.98 In 1897, Richard Loper, the general manager of
The Guarantor’s Liability Indemnity Company, and not a Conference
member, charged that the Liability Conference’s rate-setting activities
made it a trust.99 Conference President George Seward responded by stres-
sing that the Conference had formed to avoid “ruinous” competition, not to
“drive any competitor out of the field.” He added: “And might not such
combinations be styled ‘combinations to maintain solvent conditions’
instead of ‘combinations in restraint of trade?’”100
In private, Travelers President Batterson, for one, worried about state
antitrust law. In October 1897, Batterson had complained to Conference
arbitrator Marks about agents who had discussed with policyholders the
substance of Conference agreement disputes, “This has been done in
numerous cases, and in a way which gives direct evidence of a combination
to fix prices for rates for insurance held, which has been held by Courts in
some states to be unlawful.” If the Conference could not stop agents from
discussing complaints to policyholders, then “we are all at sea and the
result will be disasterous [sic].”101
The available evidence, however, does not clearly show that any worry
about state competition law caused a Liability Conference company to stop
selling liability insurance in any particular state. Although most states
enacted antitrust statutes from 1889 through 1914, only a few states
enacted antitrust statutes that expressly referred to insurance.102
98. See, for example, Address of E.C. Irwin, President, National Board of Fire
Underwriters, in Chicago Conference On Trusts: Speeches, Debates, Resolutions, List of
Delegates, Committees, Etc.; Held September 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 1899 (Chicago:
Civic Federation of Chicago, 1900), 438, 450.
99. “The Alleged Trust in Liability Insurance,” The Spectator, April 29, 1897, 209 (quot-
ing Loper as stating: “‘I am fighting the insurance trust, and the trust is trying to destroy my
company.’”).
100. George F. Seward, “Liability Insurance,” in The Insurance Year Book. 1897–8 [Life
and Miscellaneous] (New York: Spectator Co., 1897), 237–38. For similar arguments, see
“The Alleged Trust in Liability Insurance,” The Spectator, April 29, 1897, 209; and “The
Liability Conference,” The Standard, May 8, 1897, 514.
101. Batterson to Stewart Marks, Esq., Chief, Bureau of Statistics & Arbitration, October
11, 1897, PL3, p. 88–89.
102. “Statutes and Digested Decisions of Federal, State, and Territorial Law Relating to
Trusts and Industrial Combinations,” prepared by Jeremiah W. Jenks, Expert Agent, in
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Moreover, from 1896 through March 1906—the tenure of the Liability
Conference—state antitrust statutes in only Kansas (1889) and Nebraska
(1897) expressly covered more than fire or property insurance,103 and
courts in only Iowa (1897) and Mississippi (1897) declared that insurance
fell within the ambit of other words in their state antitrust statutes.104
Although a few state courts opined to the contrary,105 in most states, the
courts did not publish opinions concerning whether their state’s antitrust
statute covered insurance. State courts in Indiana (1884) and Illinois
(1905), however, had opined that a combination to fix fire insurance
rates amounted to a restraint of trade that violated state common law.106
Industrial Commission, Trusts and Industrial Combinations, H.R. Doc. 476, 56th Cong., 1st
Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900), vol. 2, pt. 1, pp. 5–264; Laws on
Trusts and Monopolies (Washington: Government Printing Office, rev. ed. 1914), 41–
361; and Clarence W. Hobbs, “State Regulation of Insurance Rates,” Proceedings of the
Casualty Actuarial Society 11 (1925): 227–63 (digest of state statutes affecting insurance).
103. Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 257, § 1, 1889 Kan. Sess. Laws 389, 389 (covering efforts
to “control the cost or rate of insurance”); and Act of —, 1897, ch. 79, § 1, cl. 3, 5, 1897
Neb. Laws 347, 347–48 (covering combinations “[t]o prevent competition in insurance,
either life, fire, accident, or any other kind”).
104. American Fire Insurance Co. v. State, 22 So. 99, 103–04 (Miss. 1897) (fire insurance
rate-making association was effort to control a “business” under state antitrust statute); and
Beechley v. Mulville, 70 N.W. 107, 109 (Iowa 1897) (insurance is “commodity” under 1890
state antitrust statute).
105. See Aetna Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth, 51 S.W. 624, 626 (Ky. 1899) (right to
enter into an insurance contract is not included in the word “property”); Queens Insurance
Co. v. State, 24 S.W. 397, 401 (Tex. 1893) (fire insurance not covered by terms “trade”,
“commerce,” or “commodity”), abrogated by Act of April 30, 1895, ch. 83, 1895 Tex.
Gen. Laws 112, 113–14; see also Biennial Report of the Attorney General of the State of
Illinois (Springfield: Phillips Bros., 1899), 228 (opinion, dated October 8, 1897, that state
antitrust act of 1891 “does not apply to insurance companies,” where that act covered efforts
to fix the price of “any article of merchandise or commodity” or to limit the quantity of any
“article, commodity or merchandise” sold in the state, Act of June 11, 1891, § 1, 1891 Ill.
Laws 206, 207). In Ohio, see Runck v. Cloud, 8 Ohio N.P. 436, 1901 WL 19368 (Ohio
Super. Ct. 1901) (insurance not covered by Ohio antitrust statute); State ex rel. Taylor
v. Ross, 16 Ohio Dec. 704, 1906 WL 1575 (Ct. Common Pleas 1906) (fire insurance covered
by Ohio antitrust statute) (decided May 5, 1906); and State v. Bovee, 17 Ohio Dec. 663, 1907
WL 719 (Ct. Common Pleas 1907) (insurance not covered by Ohio antitrust statute).
106. People v. Aachen & Munich Fire Insurance Company of Germany, 126 Ill. App. 636
(4th Dist. 1905) (reversing demurrer in a suit by the Illinois Attorney General against 110
fire insurance companies for common law conspiracy to fix fire insurance rates in
St. Clair and Madison counties); and Metzger v. Cleveland & Adams (Ind. Superior Ct.,
Marion County, decided April 1884), in Insurance Law Journal 28 (1899): 176–82.
But see Continental Ins. Co. v. Board of Fire Underwriters of the Pacific, 67 F. 310, 322
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1895) (fire underwriters board not common law conspiracy, because board
formed for “trade reasons, in which the co-operation of all companies was undoubtedly
desired,” not specifically to intermeddle in plaintiff’s business).
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Moreover, although state legislatures, largely in the Midwest and the
South, also enacted so-called anti-compact statutes that specifically banned
cooperative rate setting for insurance policies, at least up through 1910,
most of these laws covered only fire insurance or fire insurance compa-
nies.107 Only the statutes in Georgia (1891) and Alabama (1897) were
not limited on paper to any particular kind of insurance or insurance
company.108
Of the states just identified, five experienced legislative or judicial action
during the Conference’s tenure that arguably raised the odds that the
Conference agreement would be found to violate that state’s law: Alabama
(1897); Iowa (1897); Nebraska (1897); Mississippi (1897); and Illinois
(1905). If a Conference firmworried enough about a state’s legislative or judi-
cial action in that year, we should expect that firm to stop receiving liability
insurance premiums in that state soon thereafter—a proxy for liability insur-
ance sales—but not stop selling other types of insurance it had been selling
there.
Although there are limited available state-level data on liability insur-
ance premiums, those data do not indicate significant movement out of
Alabama, Iowa, and Nebraska in a three-year period after 1897
(Table 3). Unfortunately, the relevant data for Mississippi are missing.
Any causal inference concerning the 1905 Illinois appellate court decision
107. Act of May 4, 1885, 1885 Ohio Laws 231 (amended by Act of May 1, 1891, 1891
Ohio Laws 485–86); Act of Aug. 29, 1885, ch. 93, § 1, 1885 N.H. Laws 289, 289; Act of
March 28, 1893, ch. 285, 1893 Me. Acts 339 (repealed by Act of Feb. 18, 1895, c. 26, 1895
Me. Acts 24); Act of —, 1897, ch. 81, § 1, 1897 Neb. Laws 354; Act of March 1, 1898, ch.
644, § 1, 1898 Va. Acts 683, 683 (effective July 1, 1898); Act of March 7, 1899, No. 39, § 1,
1899 S.C. Acts 59, 59; Act of March 2, 1900, ch. 680, 1899–00 Va. Laws 718; Act of July
11, 1900, No. 110, 1900 La. Laws 172; Act of March 9, 1903, ch. 158, 1903 S.D. Laws 183;
Act of March 4, 1905, ch. 424, 1905 N.C. Laws 429; Act of April 17, 1905, ch. 479, § 1,
1905 Tn. Laws 1019, 1019. A few covered fire and other types of property insurance. Act of
April 3, 1896, ch. 22, § 1, 1896 Iowa Laws 31; and Act of March 13, 1897, ch. 65, § 9, 1897
Wash. Sess. Laws 105, 110. Two more states covered fire, marine, and marine and inland
insurance companies. Act of June 28, 1887, No. 285, §§ 1–2, 1887 Mich. Pub. Acts 384,
384–85; and Act of April 27, 1897, ch. 356, 1897 Wis. Sess. Laws 908. Excerpts of
some of these statutes appear in “Anti-Compact Laws,” Hayden’s Annual Cyclopedia of
Insurance in the United States 1908–1909 (Hartford: Insurance Journal Co., 1909), 30–
43. Excluded here are provisions that were part of or added to antitrust statutes.
108. Act of Oct. 21, 1891, No. 745, § 1, 1891 Ga. Laws 206 (unlawful for “any insurance
company or companies” to enter into arrangement with “any other insurance company or
companies . . . for purpose of, or that may have tendency or effect of, preventing or lessening
competition in the business of insurance transacted in this state”); and Act of Feb. 18, 1897,
1897 Ala. Laws 1428 (providing policyholder to recover, in event of loss or damage, an
additional twenty-five percent of the actual loss upon proving that the insurer, at the time
of the policy or before trial, was “in any way connected” with premium rate-fixing).
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is complicated by the close proximity of this decision to the Conference’s
end in 1906.109
Moreover, in September 1899, the Union Casualty and Surety Company—
a Liability Conference member at the time—announced that it had agreed
to transfer the liabilities of all its unexpired liability insurance policies to a
non-Conference rival, the Maryland Casualty Company, along with its
reinsurance reserve on those unexpired policies.110 Although reported in
some newspapers as simply a notable business deal, at least one newspa-
per, the St. Louis Republic, reported that Union Casualty had initiated
talks with Maryland Casualty in July 1899, because Union Casualty feared
that the Missouri attorney general would sue it for participating in the
Liability Conference.111 (As a Missouri corporation, Union Casualty
Table 3. Number of Liability Conference Firms Collecting Liability Premiums in
Selected States, 1897–1900.
1897 1898 1899 1900
Alabama 5 4a 4 4
Iowa — 5a 5b 5
Nebraska — 4 — 5
Mississippi — — — —
Sources: The Insurance Year Book 1901–1902 [Life and Miscellaneous] (New York:
Spectator Co., 1901), 421, 427, 435; The Insurance Year Book 1900–1901 [Life and
Miscellaneous] (New York: Spectator Co., 1900), 391, 396, 403; The Insurance Year
Book 1899–1900 [Life and Miscellaneous] (New York: Spectator Co., 1899), 363,
368–69, 375; and The Insurance Year Book 1898–9 [Life and Miscellaneous] (New York:
Spectator Co., 1898), 335, 344.
Notes: “—” indicates missing data. Maryland Casualty Company is not treated as a
Conference member until 1900.
aNot counted is the Standard Life and Accident Company, which received accident insurance
premiums, received zero liability premiums, and incurred liability losses.
bStandard Life and Accident Insurance Company resumed collecting liability premiums,
whereas the Fidelity and Casualty Company received some accident insurance premiums
and zero liability premiums.
109. People v. Aachen & Munich Fire Insurance Company of Germany, 126 Ill. App. 636
(4th Dist. 1905) (opinion filed September 18, 1905). Petition for rehearing was denied on
February 28, 1906, less than a month before the Conference’s end as a cartel. Ibid.
110. “A Big Scoop By the Maryland Casualty,” United States Review, September 7, 1899,
157; see also “A Deal Completed: Western Business Absorbed by the Maryland Casualty
Company,” The Sun (Baltimore), September 2, 1899, 12; and “Insurance Companies
Unite: The Maryland Casualty and the Union Casualty of St. Louis,” New York Times,
September 3, 1899, 12.
111. “Big Insurance Deal Is Consummated: Union Casualty Company of St. Louis Sells
Its Unexpired Liability Risks,” St. Louis Republic, September 2, 1899, pt. II, 1. When asked
whether it struck the deal to avoid antitrust prosecution, company general manager Theodore
Law and History Review, May 2011402
could not avoid a lawsuit by the Missouri attorney general simply by not
selling liability insurance business in that state.) I have no primary evi-
dence to corroborate this assertion.
Finally, state antitrust laws seem more plausible as a pretext for
Travelers’ exit from the Liability Conference. In April 1899, as state anti-
trust legislation and lawsuits proceeded against fire insurance companies in
Missouri and Arkansas,112 Travelers President Batterson wrote to
Conference President Seward: “I believe . . . that the Missouri and the
other like laws will be sprung upon us, and if fought out in the courts
we will be beaten sure.” He announced that Travelers “decides to withdraw
from the Conference so far as rates are concerned, and remain for the pur-
pose of comparing and combining experience.” He complained that the
Conference companies “have the credit for” liability insurance premium
rates, even though non-Conference companies really controlled rates
through their rate-cutting. Accordingly, he argued, the Conference compa-
nies would be better off just pooling their loss-experience data “as we can
under any other system which it is so strongly made the subject of adverse
legislation.”113
Despite this declaration, Travelers did not exit the Conference. It
remained inside for over a year more. In January 1900, Batterson
declared that because of the Conference practice of special rates,
Travelers’ “present intention” was to leave the Liability Conference at its
Gaty reportedly replied: “‘That is a question I do not care to answer.’” Ibid. At least three
midwestern newspapers based their own stories on the report in the St. Louis Republic.
See “Dodging Anti-Trust Law: Union Casualty Company of St. Louis Transfers Business
to a Maryland Corporation,” Morning World-Herald, September 2, 1899, 2 (Omaha news-
paper); “Takes the Cash Along: Casualty Company Executive Departs for Fear of
Prosecution,” Duluth News Tribune, September 2, 1899, 1; and “Big Insurance Deal:
Brought About by Operation of the Missouri Anti-Trust Law—Nature of the
Transaction,” Dallas Morning News, September 2, 1899, 3; see also New York Times,
September 3, 1899, 12 (“Fear that Attorney General Crow would institute proceedings
against the Union Casualty Company under the anti-trust laws of Missouri is the ascribed
cause of the deal between the Union and Maryland Casualty Companies.”). But see “A
Big Scoop By the Maryland Casualty,” United States Review, September 7, 1899, 157
(“Fears that the Attorney-General of Missouri would proceed against the Union for violation
of the anti-trust laws is one of the motives assigned by rumor as the reason for the
re-insurance. There is not much credence put in this, however.”).
112. For Missouri, see Piott, Anti-Monopoly, 37–51. For Arkansas, see Act of March 6,
1899, Act XLI, § 1, 1899 Ark. Acts 50, 50–55; “No Insurance in Arkansas: Under the
Anti-Trust Law 63 Companies Are Sued for $315,000 Each and Are Taking No More
Risks,” New York Times, April 1, 1899, 2; and State v. Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 51 S.W.
633 (Ark. 1899).
113. Batterson to Geo. F. Seward Esq., Chairman &c., April 12, 1899, PL3, p. 639.
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next meeting.114 Around this time, Batterson was also frustrated with
Travelers’ liability business.115 A few days later, at the February 27
Conference meeting in Hartford, the Conference apparently took up the
matter of special-rating abuse116 and, according to the Standard, voted
that it would no longer require Conference members to abide by manual
rates. The Conference’s Bureau of Arbitration and Statistics would, there-
fore, be renamed the Bureau of Statistics, and Stewart Marks, formerly the
Conference arbitrator, now had the title of actuary. The main reason for this
change, reported the Standard, was “the embarrassment experienced by
some companies in states which have anti-trust laws.”117
Although what happened in that meeting is unclear, the Conference
agreement apparently retained some price-fixing features, because by
April, Batterson was again giving notice of Travelers’ “immediate withdra-
wal” from the Conference, again because of the special rating system.118
When Conference President Seward tried to pressure Batterson to stay in
the Conference, in part on the ground that the Conference had tried to
accommodate Travelers’ concerns at the February 27 meeting, Batterson
would have none of it: “That the original agreement ‘was abandoned
mainly out of regard for our difficulties’ is news to me. My recollection
is that the agreement was abandoned for legal reasons which affected all
alike.”119
By August, however, Batterson still had not “confirmed our resignation
from the Conference for fear of its effect upon our own agents, who would
immediately make demands that we could not grant.”120 Another reason
for the delay was that at the time, Michigan Insurance Commissioner H.
H. Stevens was auditing Travelers’ liability insurance business; accord-
ingly, Batterson told Seward to put “further action about Conference
matters” on hold, and promised not to “withdraw the rate books from
our agents.”121
Several weeks later, Batterson publicly criticized Commissioner Stevens,
who after completing his audit, billed Travelers what Batterson considered to
be an exorbitant amount for expenses and, when Travelers refused to pay,
114. Batterson to Seward, January 15, 1900, PL3, p. 961; see also Batterson to Marks,
January 18, 1900, PL3, p. 963; and Batterson to Stone, January 27, 1900 PL3, p. 972.
115. James G. Batterson, President, to J.G. Batterson, Jr., Gen. Mgr., Travelers Ins. Co. N.
Y., December 13, 1899, PL3, p. 927–28.
116. “Liability Conference in a Protracted Session,” The Standard, March 3, 1900, 13.
117. “Liability Rates Are No Longer Mandatory,” The Standard, March 10, 1900, 11.
118. Batterson to Stewart Marks, April 11, 1900, PL4, p. 47.
119. Batterson to Geo. F. Seward, April 14, 1900, PL4, p. 54.
120. Batterson to Seward, August 18, 1900, PL4, p. 169.
121. Batterson to Seward, August 25, 1900, PL4, p. 178.
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allegedly threatened Travelers’ business in Michigan.122 A few days later,
George Seward wrote to the Journal of Commerce and Commercial
Bulletin, which had similarly criticized Commissioner Stevens, to defend
Stevens’ reputation and, in so doing, suggested that Batterson had the dis-
cretion of a “bull in a china shop” and had “Irish blood in his veins.”123 In
a letter to the Journal, Batterson replied to Seward’s comments.124 That
same day, Batterson wrote a letter to Conference Actuary Marks in
which he “confirm[ed]” Travelers’ withdrawal from the Conference.125
Hearing of this news, Seward privately celebrated: “We are all to be con-
gratulated . . . on having at last the Travelers on the outside, their uncertain
attitude having long been a cause of embarrassment.”126
When Batterson died less than a year later,127 Sylvester Dunham became
Travelers’ president. Among the congratulatory letters, Dunham received
one from Maryland Casualty President John Stone, who observed that he
had “always thought” that Batterson’s exit from the Conference had
been “largely influenced by personal feeling toward one of the
Conference members,” an apparent reference to Seward. And then, Stone
invited Dunham to have Travelers return to the Conference. Dunham
quickly wrote back to refuse: “I can imagine a conference of liability com-
panies, conducted in such a way as to be extremely useful to all its mem-
bers, and I am by no means hopeless that at some time in the future such an
organization will exist and be participated in by the officers of this
122. “Michigan’s Insurance Supervision Exposed: How the Insurance Commissioner
Makes Examinations,” Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin, September 21,
1900, 1 (quoting statement of Batterson, which includes itemized bill of expenses, dated
September 13, 1900); and “Travelers Examined: Another Raid on the Insurance
Company,” Hartford Courant, September 22, 1900, 5 (same).
123. “Mr. Seward on Insurance Examinations,” letter from Geo. F. Seward to editor, dated
September 22, 1900, in Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin, September 25,
1900, 4.
124. “Mr. Batterson Replies to Mr. Seward,” Journal of Commerce and Commercial
Bulletin, September 26, 1900, 9 (letter to editor, dated September 25, 1900).
125. Batterson to Stewart Marks Esq., Actuary, &c., September 25, 1900, PL4, p. 197.
126. George F. Seward to Hon. W.C. Maybury, Standard Life & Accident Co., September
27, 1900, in Seward Papers, New York Historical Society, Box 4, Folder 10. On October 6,
1900, the Standard announced the news that Travelers had left the “Liability Compact,”
pointing to Seward’s reference to Batterson as a bull in a china shop as “the chief reason
of [sic] the rupture,” but also mentioning Batterson’s concern about the special rating prac-
tice among Conference members. “Travelers Quits Liability Compact After All,” The
Standard, October 6, 1900, 336.
127. “Travelers’ ‘Grand Old Man’ Is Dead,” The Standard, September 21, 1901, 251; and
“James G. Batterson: Death Came at Early Hour To-day,” The Hartford Courant, September
18, 1901, 1.
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Company with dignity and self respect.”128 For Dunham, it seems, the
Liability Conference was no longer useful to Travelers’ liability insurance
business. Dunham did not mention state antitrust law.
D. Liability Loss Reserve Regulation
This section develops the idea that state regulation of liability loss reserves
partly explains the Conference’s fall, because Conference companies had
valued Conference membership in part as a credible signal to buyers that
those companies had lower insolvency risk than their non-Conference riv-
als.129 To make this signal credible, Conference companies had to show
that Conference manual rates reflected better estimates of liability risk,
as a result of Conference information pooling. When Michigan became
the first state to regulate liability insurers’ loss reserves in 1901, the
Conference faced a competing signal of insolvency risk, and the
Conference became more interested in securing more favorable liability
loss reserve regulation. Several key states enacted such regulation in
1905, and the Conference officially abandoned price fixing less than a
year later. Causal inference here is complicated, because Conference mem-
bers might have substantially varied in how much they valued Conference
membership as a solvency signal, particularly as compared to other reasons
they had for joining the Conference. Still, the available evidence is consist-
ent enough with this causal story to warrant further research.
1. Conference Membership as Solvency Signal
Since the Liability Conference’s inception, the Conference companies
appear to have stressed the connection between Conference membership
and lower insolvency risk. As C.P. Ellerbe, then ex-president of the
Union Casualty and Surety Company, wrote in a letter to George
Seward in late September 1899, “I am more convinced the Liability
Conference ought to be maintained, even if the agreement as to rates is
not always well kept. For nearly four years the agents have been preaching
the solvency of the Compact Companies and the insolvency of
128. John Stone, President, Maryland Casualty Company, to Mr. S.C. Dunham, Harford
Conn., October 17, 1901, and Dunham to Stone, October 18, 1901; and Letters of
Congratulation on His Election as President of the Travelers Insurance Co.; 100th
Anniversary; Communications, Record Group 8; Travelers Insurance Co., Hartford, CT.
129. It is not clear whether buyers did receive and act upon such a signal. This account,
however, only requires that Conference company managers believed that buyers could and
would.
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non-Compact Companies. To terminate the Conference now would be to
place the Conference Companies in an awkward position.”130
Accordingly, when the Liability Conference issued its third rate manual
in May 1901, the Conference companies touted it as the product of careful
calculations based primarily on Conference members’ pooled loss-
experience.131Indeed, a few months earlier, George Seward’s Fidelity and
Casualty Company had boasted in the company’s monthly bulletin that
this manual would be “a work which will hereafter be, to intelligent liability
underwriters, what the mortuary tables are to life underwriters.”132 A month
later, an item in the company bulletin stressed that the Fidelity and Casualty’s
contribution to the “expense of tabulating experience, including the cost at
the home office and its share of conference expenses, may reach the large
sum of $100,000.”133 When the manual was finally published, the
Standard observed that the Conference companies stressed how the
Conference had used “scientific principles” in writing the manual.134
Buyers could perceive such claims as credible, in part because the
Conference adopted in the 1901 manual a credible method for calculating
liability premium rates developed by the aptly-named Frank E. Law, of the
Fidelity and Casualty Company.135 A mechanical engineer by school-
ing,136 Law discovered that, even after collecting loss-experience data
from all the Liability Conference members, there were still not enough
data to produce separate liability-risk-sensitive premium rates for the thou-
sands of industry-specific risk classifications on a state-by-state basis, even
though liability risk varied with the law of each state.137
To solve this problem, Law aggregated loss data for all the states, and,
on that basis, fixed a base premium rate for each of many industry-specific
risk classifications. This rate included a markup for administrative expenses
130. C.P. Ellerbe to Geo. F. Seward, Esq., September 22, 1899, Folder 2, Box 4, Seward
Papers, New York Historical Society. In March 1899, C.P. Ellerbe had been replaced as
company president. “Notes of Insurance Interests,” New York Times, March 9, 1899, 14.
131. “New Book of Liability Rates Issued,” The Standard, May 4, 1901, 435.
132. “Liability Rates,” Monthly Bulletin of the Fidelity and Casualty Company 6
(February 1901): 19.
133. “Liability Conference,” Monthly Bulletin of the Fidelity and Casualty Company 6
(March 1901): 35
134. “Salient Features of Liability Manual,” The Standard, May 11, 1901, 461.
135. Frank E. Law, A Method of Deducing Liability Rates (New York: Spectator Co., 1908).
136. Who’s Who in Insurance: An International Biographical Dictionary and Year Book
(New York: Singer Co., 1908): 182.
137. Law,Method, 3 (“In some States not more than three or four of the 950 classifications
is written. In all, out of the possible 47,500 classifications that may be written, there is
experience on about 3,000.”). On data the Conference collected, see Otis, “The Bureau,”
261.
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and profit. Then, he derived a “counter-differential” for each state—a number
that one could use to adjust the base premium rate for any risk-classifi-
cation.138 For employers’ liability insurance, a state’s counter-differential,
in theory, represented the combination of two components of employer
liability risk unique to each state: (1) physical hazard, “exposure to danger
to doing work, in methods of doing work, in kind of machinery used, in
precautions taken against the occurrence of accidents, and in character
and intelligence of employees”; and (2) legal hazard,“the laws and judicial
decisions and the attitude of the community, courts, and juries toward the
question of the relations between master and man.”139
Table 4 sets forth the counter-differentials for each state for 1908. Using
these differentials was simple. For example, if the premium rate for
machine shops for the country as a whole was $0.45 per $100 of payroll,
then the machine-shops rate for Texas is that rate ($0.45) multiplied by the
Texas differential (2), or $0.90 per $100 of payroll. After 1901, Conference
manuals contained a table of state counter-differentials for certain risk
classifications.140 Each state counter-differential rested on the premise
that future liability exposure would track past experience, and that therefore
the actuary had to raise or lower that counter-differential manually to
reflect recent changes in state law that would not yet be reflected in
the Conference’s pooled loss data.141 Still, Law’s method provided
Conference companies with arguably better estimates of liability risk.
Just as important, his method made credible the efforts to persuade buyers
that a Conference company’s liability policy carried less insolvency risk,
albeit only if buyers also believed that the company usually sold that policy
according to the Conference manual premium rate.
138. Law, Method, 22–23. To produce this number, Law assumed a base loss-cost of 1 for
the country as a whole. For each state, he then multiplied the mean premium rates for the
country as a whole by the payrolls for the various risk classifications in each state, as
well as for total payroll in the state. This resulted in a “pure premium” income for every
risk classification in the state, plus one more for the state as a whole. Law divided this
pure premium income into the losses for each risk classification in the state, which produced
the “pure” or “normal” loss-ratio for every risk classification in the state, plus another for the
state as a whole. Finally, Law divided the normal loss ratio for each state (and for each indi-
vidual risk classification therein) by the normal loss ratio for the country as a whole. Ibid.
139. Frank E. Law, “Liability Insurance: Premium Rates” in The Business of Insurance: A
Text Book and Reference Work Covering All Lines of Insurance, vol. 2, ed. Howard P.
Dunham (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1912), 255.
140. Manual of Liability Insurance Containing the Rules, Instructions, Rates and
Classifications adopted by the Conference of Liability Companies and amended to
January 1, 1905, 24.
141. Law, Method, 23.
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2. Liability Loss Reserve Regulation as a Competing Solvency Signal
If Conference companies valued Conference membership as a solvency
signal, we should expect that they would value that signal less as states
began regulating liability loss reserves, because company compliance
with such regulation provided a competing signal of company solvency.
Although companies selling liability insurance had been subject to general
minimum capital requirements,142 by the 1890s, only a few states had
enacted special deposit requirements for liability insurers,143 and no state
had set minimums for liability loss reserves.
Table 4. State Counter-Differentials for Employers’ Liability
Alabama 1.20 Louisiana 0.70 Ohio 0.80
Arizona Territory 2.00 Maine 1.00 Oklahoma
Territory
2.00
Arkansas 1.33 Maryland 0.70 Oregon 0.80
California 1.00 Massachusetts 1.00 Pennsylvania 1.00
Colorado 2.00 Michigan 0.60 Rhode Island 1.33
Connecticut 0.60 Minnesota 1.33 South Carolina 1.20
Delaware 1.33 Mississippi 0.80 South Dakota 2.00
District of
Columbia
0.90 Missouri 1.33 Tennessee 2.00
Florida 0.60 Montana 0.80 Texas 2.00
Georgia 1.20 Nebraska 1.33 Utah 2.00
Idaho 2.00 New Hampshire 1.00 Virginia 0.70
Illinois 1.33 New Jersey 0.70 Vermont 1.00
Indiana 1.20 New Mexico
Territory
2.00 Washington 2.00
Indian Territory 2.00 Nevada 2.00 West Virginia 0.70
Iowa 1.33 New York 1.00 Wisconsin 1.33
Kansas 2.00 North Carolina 1.20 Wyoming 2.00
Kentucky 1.33 North Dakota 2.00
Source: Frank E. Law, A Method of Deducing Liability Rates (New York: Spectator Co.,
1908) (chart 2).
142. See, for example, Massachusetts Insurance Act of 1887, ch. 214, § 31, 1887 Mass.
Laws 776, 790.
143. Act of May 19, 1894, § 1, 1894 Ohio Laws 352 (requiring out-of-state liability insur-
ance companies, but not in-state liability insurers, to deposit not less than $50,000 in certain
securities with the Ohio superintendent of insurance “for the benefit, security and protection
of the policy-holders of the company residing within this state”); Act of Feb. 18, 1897, No.
614, § 8, 1897 Ala. Laws 1377, 1381–82 (state-administered “Liability Reserve” charging
liability insurers a minimum of $300 for each pending lawsuit against a company’s
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Although the early liability insurers resisted these deposit requirements,
they appear to have had little success. For example, in 1894, Travelers had
joined with Fidelity and Casualty, Union Casualty and Surety, and the
Standard Life and Accident Company of Detroit to thwart passage of
Ohio legislation requiring out-of-state liability insurers to make a
$50,000 deposit to do business in the state.144 In public, insurer objections
to the then-proposed legislation included that it discriminated against
out-of-state insurers, and that it was prohibitively expensive, particularly
if other states adopted the same policy.145 Privately, the insurers feared
that other states would follow Ohio’s lead, and then, as Batterson put it
to Seward, “we will none of us have money enough to make the circuit.”146
And they strongly suspected that the statute was a protectionist measure to
aid Ohio’s in-state insurance companies.147
When their efforts failed, and the bill became law, the liability insurers
went to court. On March 12, 1895, the Fidelity and Casualty Company
filed a petition in Circuit Court, Franklin County, against the Ohio super-
intendent of insurance, arguing that Ohio’s 1894 deposit requirement
violated provisions of the Ohio State Constitution.148 Although Fidelity
and Casualty was the only nominal plaintiff, the litigation in Fidelity &
Casualty Co. v. Hahn was, like the failed lobbying effort, coordinated
with Travelers, Standard Life and Accident, and Union Casualty and
Surety. Those insurers had waited until early 1895, when their licenses
to do business in Ohio were set to expire,149 and then demanded
policyholders “for which it may be liable in the lower court and $700.00 additional when
suit is appealed by the defendant to a higher court”); and Act of April 21, 1899, § 3,
1899 Ill. Laws 237, 239 (requiring casualty companies organized under Illinois law to
“do business” with a minimum capital stock of $100,000 “fully paid in cash,” with an
additional $50,000 for every additional “kind of insurance” it was authorized to sell, but set-
ting the minimum for companies insuring liability for accidental injuries at $200,000).
144. Batterson to Geo. F. Seward, Esq., Prest., June 26, 1894, PL2, p. 457.
145. The Travelers Insurance Co., by J. Batterson, Objections to the Bill (H.B. No. 279),
undated, PL2, p. 384–86; Batterson to Geo. F. Seward, Esq., President, dated May 7, 1894,
PL2, p. 413; and Batterson to P.W. Ditto, Esq., Neil House, Columbus, Ohio, April 10,
1894, PL2, p. 389.
146. Batterson to Geo. F. Seward, Prest., March 12, 1894, PL2, p. 376.
147. Batterson to Geo. F. Seward, Prest., March 26, 1894, PL2, p. 380.
148. Petition, Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Hahn, Court of Common Pleas, Franklin County,
Ohio, filed March 12, 1895, in Record, Supreme Court of Ohio, Fidelity & Casualty
Co. v. Hahn.
149. Batterson to Seward, June 19, 1894, PL2, p. 449; Batterson to W.C. Maybury, Esq.,
Managing Director, etc. [Standard Life & Accident Co.], Detroit, Mich., December 28,
1894, PL2, p. 660.
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unconditional licenses, the denial of which would set up the lawsuit chal-
lenging the 1894 statute.150
The liability insurers’ lawyers, however, had limited options. Although
the 1894 statute treated out-of-state insurers worse than Ohio insurers, a
federal constitutional challenge would be unlikely to succeed. It was settled
that corporations did not count as “Citizens” under Article IV’s Privileges
and Immunities Clause.151 The United States Supreme Court had
confirmed only a few months earlier that the insurance business still fell
outside of Congress’ Article I power to regulate “Commerce” among the
several states.152 Nor would the insurers fare better by arguing that the
Ohio statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment promise that no state
shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.” In 1886, the Supreme Court had read that provision not to
constrain New York from denying admission to an out-of-state insurance
corporation that refused to pay, as a condition of admission, a license
fee that New York imposed only on out-of-state corporations. The Court
reasoned that, in those circumstances, the corporation was not “within
[the state’s] jurisdiction,” but on the outside looking in, and therefore
not eligible for whatever equal protection the Fourteenth Amendment
promised.153
Instead, the insurers’ lawyers primarily argued that the Ohio legislature
had violated legislative process provisions of the Ohio State Constitution
that governed what to put in bill titles and how to amend statutes.154
The insurers lost.155 In response, both Travelers and Standard Life and
Accident paid the $50,000 deposit, whereas both Union Casualty &
150. Weekly Underwriter, March 9, 1895, 173; and Weekly Underwriter, May 25, 1895,
377.
151. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2; Paul, 75 U.S. at 178–82.
152. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895) (decided January 7,
1895).
153. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Fire Association of Philadelphia v. People of the State
of New York, 119 U.S. 110, 119 (1886). This view is “now discarded.” Western & Southern
Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 660 n. 12 (1981) (citations
omitted).
154. Brief of Plaintiff in Error in Supreme Court of Ohio, Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Hahn
(filed May 2, 1895); Petition, Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Hahn, Court of Common Pleas,
Franklin County, Ohio, filed March 12, 1895, in Record, Supreme Court of Ohio, Fidelity
& Casualty Co. v. Hahn; Ohio Const. of 1851, art. II, § 16 (“No bill shall contain more
than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; and no law shall be revived,
or amended, unless the new act contain the entire act revived, or the section or the sections
amended; and the section, or sections, so amended, shall be repealed.”).
155. Opinion of Franklin County Circuit Court, March 30, 1895 (dismissing petition), re-
printed in Appendix, Brief of Defendant in Error at 28–29; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Hahn,
44 N.E. 1135 (Ohio 1895) (affirming judgment without opinion).
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Surety and Fidelity & Casualty, stopped selling liability insurance in Ohio.
In 1899, four years after it left, the Fidelity and Casualty returned, this time
agreeing to pay the $50,000 deposit to do business in the state.156
In May 1901, the same month that the new Conference Liability Manual
was issued, the Michigan legislature became the first state legislature to go
beyond nominal-dollar deposit requirements and specify how liability
insurers would set their liability loss reserves—that is, at a minimum of
forty percent of net premiums received and, at the insurance commis-
sioner’s discretion, even more if the company’s liability loss ratio consist-
ently exceeded forty percent.157 Proponents of this legislation included the
Michigan Insurance Commissioner H.H. Stevens, who less than a year ear-
lier had traveled east to examine the liability insurance business of some of
the major insurance companies, and apparently found their liability loss
reserves to be inadequate.158
This time, in response to the Michigan law, the liability insurers did not
go to court, as they had in Ohio years earlier. They instead lobbied for an
alternative method of liability loss reserve regulation that mirrored Liability
Conference practice. In 1902, Fidelity and Casualty President George
Seward argued in a letter to the National Convention of Insurance
Commissioners that state insurance regulators should apply the pure-
premium method (Frank Law’s method, although Seward did not credit
Law) of calculating liability premiums to the calculation of liability loss
reserves. By multiplying the pure premium losses for the country as a
whole by the counter-differentials for each state, one could produce “a
‘standard table of experience’ to be used in determining loss reserves.”159
In contrast, Seward complained, Michigan’s forty-percent basis for setting
liability loss reserve minimums was arbitrary and its method required
assuming “that all companies get equal premiums for equal hazards.”
This assumption, he argued, was both false and would result in smaller
liability reserves for rate-cutting companies—the perverse result of
156. Weekly Underwriter, May 25, 1895, 380; and The Standard, August 26, 1899, 197.
157. Act of May 29, 1901, No. 190, § 3, 1901 Mich. Pub. Acts 268, 269–70; Proceedings
of the Thirty-Third Annual Convention of Insurance Commissioners of the United States
(Springfield: H.W. Rokker Co., 1903), 66, 70. In 1905, the Michigan legislature raised
the minimum to fifty percent of premiums received and earned. See Act of May 25,
1905, No. 137, 1905 Mich. Pub. Acts 186, 187.
158. Frank E. Law, A Review of Liability and Workmen’s Compensation Loss Reserve
Legislation (New York: Fidelity & Casualty Co., 1913), 3. The Michigan insurance commis-
sioner’s examination of Travelers had occasioned the exchange in which George Seward had
referred to Travelers’ President Batterson as a bull in a china shop. See text accompanying
nn. 121–123.
159. Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual Convention of Insurance Commissioners of
the United States (Springfield: H.W. Rokker Co., 1903), 67–68 (quoting Seward letter).
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requiring lower minimum reserves for liability companies with higher
insolvency risk.160 Michigan’s Insurance Commissioner Nelson Hadley
offered a lengthy defense of the Michigan law.161 The National
Convention of Insurance Commissioners ultimately refused to endorse
either approach.162
Legislative efforts continued. A year later, in 1903, New York and
Connecticut enacted statutes that used alternative methods for setting liab-
ility loss reserve minimums.163 On one account, the New York method
enacted in 1903, and amended in 1904, had been proposed by the
Travelers Insurance Company.164 Then, in 1905, five state legislatures
enacted roughly the same liability loss reserve law: California,
New York, Massachusetts, Illinois, and Connecticut.165 By forcing all liab-
ility insurers to set liability reserves according to the same criteria, insur-
ance industry supporters argued, these new laws would deter rate-cutting
and make those insurers maintain adequate reserves.166 The insurance
trade press credited Fidelity and Casualty’s George Seward with drafting
such legislation in New York,167 and liability insurers with influencing
its passage there as well as in California, Illinois, and Massachusetts.168
A few months later, when in September 1905 the Conference reported
that it would persist, some reports in the insurance trade press asserted,
160. Ibid., 68 (quoting Seward letter).
161. Ibid., 70–72.
162. Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth Annual Convention of Insurance Commissioners of
the United States (Springfield: H.W. Rokker Co., 1905), 70.
163. Act of May 12, 1903, ch. 566, 1903 N.Y. Laws 1241, 1242–43; and Act of June 11,
1903, ch. 168, § 2, 1903 Conn. Pub. Acts 129, 130. New York amended its law in 1904. Act
of April 28, 1904, ch. 468, 1904 N.Y. Laws 1173, 1174–75. See Proceedings of the
Thirty-Fifth Annual Convention of Insurance Commissioners of the United States
(Springfield: H.W. Rokker Co., 1905), 71.
164. Law, Review, 4.
165. Act of March 20, 1905, § 2, ch. 327, 1905 Calif. Laws 379–382; Act of March 30,
1905, ch. 113, 1905 N.Y. Laws 162; Act of April 13, 1905, ch. 287, 1905 Mass. Acts 206;
Act of May 16, 1905, 1905 Ill. Laws 288; and Act of July 19, 1905, ch. 272, 1905 Conn.
Pub. Acts 475. Texas enacted a similar law in 1909. Act of March 22, 1909, ch. 108, § 54,
1909 Tex. Gen. Laws 192, 208–210.
166. Letter from Sidney N. Moon to the editor of the Spectator, May 3, 1905, in
“Underwriting in Liability Insurance,” The Spectator, May 18, 1905, 257; and “New
Liability Bill in New York Legislature,” The Standard, February 4, 1905, 108.
167. “New Liability Bill in New York Legislature,” The Standard, February 4 1905, 108;
and “Liability Business—President Seward Advocates Law Regarding Loss Reserves,”
Insurance Press, February 1, 1905, 1.
168. Weekly Underwriter, June 3, 1905, 529; see also “Liability Reserves,” Monthly
Bulletin of the Fidelity & Casualty Company 10 (May 1905): 68 (“The bill drawn and pro-
moted by this company has become law in California, New York, and Massachusetts. It is
likely to become law in Illinois.”).
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perhaps mirroring the Conference public position, that Conference mem-
bers had so decided in part because they believed that the new liability
reserve statutes had or would reduce rate cutting by non-Conference
rivals.169
Less than a year later, however, the Conference declared that it had aban-
doned its price-fixing effort. The timing here is hardly dispositive, but it is
consistent with a causal story in which, assuming continued rate cutting by
non-Conference rivals, the presence of liability loss reserve statutes led
Conference company managers to value Conference membership less as
a solvency signal. That signal plausibly started to lose its value when
Michigan enacted its legislation in 1901. Conference companies, however,
had good reason not to let Michigan’s insurance commissioner gain a mon-
opoly over signaling solvency and instead to criticize Michigan’s approach
as inferior, as Seward did in 1902. Under the Michigan law, the insurance
commissioner had the discretion to raise the minimum reserve for any
particular insurer, a feature that liability insurance underwriters largely
opposed.170
In contrast, save for Connecticut’s version,171 the 1905 statutes left no
discretion to state insurance regulators to raise the company’s liability
loss reserve minimums above the minimum reserve prescribed by the sta-
tute. The 1905 Massachusetts law was typical. It required insurance com-
panies with at least a decade’s worth of experience in selling liability
insurance to file an annual statement with the state’s insurance commis-
sioner. This statement had to contain: (1) the number of persons reported
injured under all its forms of liability policies, regardless of whether
such injuries resulted in loss to the insurer; (2) the amount paid “on account
or in consequence of all injuries so reported,” including payments on law-
suits arising from such injuries, up to August 31 of the reporting year; (3)
the number of suits or actions under liability policies that arose out of the
reported injuries that had been settled by “payment or compromise”; and
(4) the amount paid for those settled suits on or before August 31 of the
reporting year. From these data, the Insurance Department calculated the
average cost per injury notice and per suit. It then multiplied each of
those averages by the number of open accident and lawsuit files for
every liability insurer doing business in the state.172 The result was a
169. “Decide to Continue the Liability Conference,” The Standard, September 16, 1905,
259; and Weekly Underwriter, September 16, 1905, 188.
170. Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth Annual Convention, 71–72 (reporting that majority of
liability underwriters consulted by the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners’
Committee on Reserves Other than Life opposed such discretion).
171. 1905 Conn. Pub. Acts at 476–77, § 3
172. 1905 Mass. Acts 206, § 1.
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minimum liability loss reserve for each liability insurer derived from the
loss experience of the older liability insurance companies.
To be sure, commentators criticized the 1905 statutes,173 and in 1911,
state legislatures adopted another way to set liability loss reserve
minimums in Washington, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Connecticut,
New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Georgia.174 Yet, the 1911 statutes
underscore how much liability insurers valued solvency regulation without
regulator discretion. The National Convention of Insurance Commissioners
had endorsed what became the 1911 statutes after consulting with a com-
mittee of representatives of the major liability insurance companies.175
That committee would only unanimously support a law that did not auth-
orize the state insurance regulator to order additional liability loss reserves
above the prescribed minimum.176
By then, the major liability insurers were cooperating in another way as
well. In December 1910, some months after New York enacted its first
workmen’s compensation statute, nineteen liability insurers formed the
Workmen’s Compensation Service and Information Bureau—an effort to
price worker compensation policies that, some months later, merged with
the Liability Conference’s Bureau of Liability Statistics, and later promul-
gated policies and rates for the growing market for automobile liability
173. Proceedings of the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners of the United
States (Springfield: H.W. Rokker Co., 1908), 140 (minimum reserves not “anywhere near
large enough”); S.H. Wolfe, “Reserve for Unpaid Liability Losses,” Weekly Underwriter,
February 15, 1908, 127–28 (similar); “The Future of Liability Insurance,” The Spectator,
October 11, 1906, 180 (encourages accident underreporting); and Law, Review, 9–12 (aver-
age costs of notices of injury and lawsuits vary considerably by liability insurer).
174. See Act of March 10, 1911, ch. 49, § 95, 1911 Wash. Laws 161, 236; Act of April
20, 1911, ch. 315, 1911 Mass. Acts 268; Act of April 20, 1911, ch. 315, 1911 Minn. Gen.
Laws 439, 440–43; Act of April 27, 1911, ch. 44, 1911 Conn. Pub. Acts 1296; Act of May
24, 1911, ch. 183, 1911 N.Y. Laws 285, 287–91; Act of June 1, 1911, 1911 Pa. Laws 604;
Act of June 12, 1911, 1911 Ohio Laws 477; Act of Aug. 22, 1911, No. 266, 1911 Ga. Laws
174; Edwin W. DeLeon, “Casualty, Surety, and Miscellaneous Insurance in the United
States,” in The Insurance Year Book. 1912–1913 [Life, Casualty and Miscellaneous.]
(New York: Spectator Co., 1912), A-88–A-89. For criticism of this method, see I.M.
Rubinow, “Liability Loss Reserves,” Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial and
Statistical Society of America 1 (1915): 279–94.
175. Weekly Underwriter, June 4, 1910, 444 (naming committee members).
176. William T. Emmett, “Adequate Reserves Against Employers’ Liability and
Workmen’s Compensation Risks,” in Proceedings of the National Convention of
Insurance Commissioners of the United States (Columbia: R.L. Bryan Co., 1912), 229–
30; Benedict D. Flynn, “Statistics and Reserves,” in The Business of Insurance, 323–24;
and Proceedings of the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners of the United
States, vol. 2 (Helena: State Publishing Co., 1910), 170–72.
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insurance.177 In some states, this effort operated with express regulatory
sanction. For example, the New York legislature had enacted in 1911
the first statute to expressly sanction fire insurance rating bureaus and
rely on their rate manuals to police insurers for any “unfair” price discrimi-
nation.178 In 1912, the New York legislature amended that law to authorize
rate-making associations for other kinds of insurance, including liability
and workmen’s compensation insurance, as well as automobile liability
insurance.179
Conclusion
A decade after liability insurance for personal injury accidents came to
America, the leading liability insurance companies agreed to fix premium
rates and pool liability loss information. This article discussed four poss-
ible reasons why the cartel abandoned their price-fixing effort in 1906:
price competition by non-Conference rivals; defection by Conference com-
panies; fear of state competition laws; and state regulation of liability loss
reserves.
This article concluded that price competition by non-Conference rivals
played an important role in the Conference’s fall. In contrast, state compe-
tition law appears not to have made much of a difference. This article
found insufficient evidence to assess the importance of Conference mem-
ber defection. Finally, on the available evidence, it is at least plausible that
state solvency regulation of liability insurance loss reserves reduced the
177. Fifty-Ninth Annual Report of the Superintendent of Insurance of the State of
New York: Part V (Albany: J.B. Lyon Co., 1918), 831–82 (report of examination of
National Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, August 15, 1917); Report on Workmen’s
Compensation Insurance of the Commission to Investigate Practices and Rates in
Insurance (Boston: Wright & Potter, 1915), 14–22; Fifty-Fifth Annual Report of the
Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York: Part V (Albany: J.B. Lyon & Co.,
1914), 1142–74 (report on Workmen’s Compensation Service, July 30, 1913); and
DeLeon, “Casualty, Surety, and Miscellaneous Insurance in the United States,” A-89, A-92.
178. Act of June 28, 1911, ch. 460, 1911 N.Y. Laws 1062. On the spread of fire insurance
regulation after Kansas (1909), see Marc Schneiberg and Tim Bartley, “Regulating
American Industries: Markets, Politics and the Institutional Determinants of Fire
Insurance Regulation,” American Journal of Sociology 107 (2001): 111–15, 138.
179. Act of April 5, 1912, ch. 175, § 1, 1912 N.Y. Laws 317. State sanction of cooperative
rate-setting spread faster for fire insurance. Francis R. Stoddard, Jr., “The State Supervision
and Regulation of Insurance Rates,” in Proceedings of the Fifty-Third Annual Session of the
National Convention of Insurance Commissioners (Richmond: J. W. Fergusson & Sons,
1922), 112–13 (tally of states permitting rating bureaus for, among other things, fire insur-
ance, workmen’s compensation, and liability insurance).
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value of Conference membership as a signal of company solvency, and
thereby contributed to the Conference’s fall.
In reaching these conclusions, this article is limited in part by its main
sources of evidence: insurance trade journals, state insurance regulator
reports, company bulletins, annual firm-level business data as well as the
surviving correspondence of two company presidents. In contrast to such
evidence, primary materials generated by insurance sales agents may con-
tain much evidence about agent attitudes and sales strategies, which might
help assess, for example, the solvency-signal explanation or how often
companies defected from the Conference agreement.
This article makes two main contributions. First, it confirms the expec-
tations of both cartel theory and past research on insurance cartels by show-
ing how insurers engaged in unstable price-fixing efforts and shared
information to better estimate future claims costs. Second, and perhaps
more important, this article offers a deviant case for accounts of the
legal influences on American industrial organization. Even if antitrust
law and corporate law partially explain the great merger wave, most indus-
tries at the time did not experience significant consolidation activity, and
these industries varied substantially in organizational form and inter-firm
cooperation, among other things. The rise and fall of the first liability insur-
ance cartel raises the possibility that future studies of other industries will
reveal a far greater range of possible legal influences on, and thereby help
better explain, American industrial organization at the turn of the twentieth
century.
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